Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr: Bad Medicine for Manufacturers of Unproven Medical Devices by Sigman, Kenneth T.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 47 
Issue 2 Winter 1998 Article 16 
1998 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr: Bad Medicine for Manufacturers of 
Unproven Medical Devices 
Kenneth T. Sigman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Kenneth T. Sigman, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr: Bad Medicine for Manufacturers of Unproven Medical Devices, 
47 Cath. U. L. Rev. 721 (1998). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol47/iss2/16 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
MEDTRONIC, INC. V. LOHR: BAD MEDICINE
FOR MANUFACTURERS OF UNPROVEN
MEDICAL DEVICES
Kenneth T. Sigman
As a result of the Supremacy Clause1 of the United States Constitu-
tion, federal law may preempt state law under the Preemption Doctrine.
Federal law may trump state law either when an actual conflict exists be-
tween federal and state law, or when Congress, acting within the scope of
its plenary powers, prohibits concurrent state regulation.3 Courts will
+ J.D. candidate, May 1998, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause provides: "This Constitu-
tion, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall
be the supreme Law of the Land .... " Id. Alexander Hamilton explained the basis for
the Supremacy Clause as follows:
If a number of political societies enter into a larger political society, the laws
which the latter may enact, pursuant to the powers intrusted to it by its constitu-
tion, must necessarily be supreme over those societies and the individuals of
whom they are composed. It would otherwise be a mere treaty, dependent on
the good faith of the parties, and not a government, which is only another word
for POLITICAL POWER AND SUPREMACY.
THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 204 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
James Madison explained the consequences of enacting a national constitution with a
saving clause granting the state constitutions supremacy over the national constitution.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 286 (James Madison). First, because each of the state
constitutions created absolute sovereignty in the state legislatures, except where the Arti-
cles of Confederation provided otherwise, the powers of the national government would
be annulled by the state constitutions to the extent that the national powers exceeded
those enumerated under the Articles of Confederation. See id. The result would be a new
Congress as "impotent" as its predecessor. See id. Additionally, because the state consti-
tutions differ from each other, a law passed by the national legislature--equally important
to every state-might be unconstitutional in some states and valid in others. See id. at 287.
2. See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 12.1, at 62-63 (2d ed. 1992); see
also Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992); New
York Cent. R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 148 (1917). But cf. Stephen A. Gardbaum,
The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 773-74, 776-77 (1994) (arguing that
the federal preemption power is not derived from the Supremacy Clause because the
Clause is a dispute resolution provision).
3. See 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 2, § 12.1, at 63. The underlying rationale
behind the Preemption Doctrine is "to avoid conflicting regulation of conduct" by two
rulemaking bodies. Id. at 72. For this reason, the doctrine is applied not only to legislative
enactments, but also to regulations emanating from administrative bodies and court deci-
sions. See 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b) (1997) (defining the preemptive scope of a federal statute
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find preemption in two circumstances. First, express preemption arises
when Congress includes a provision in a statute that explicitly prohibits
state regulation of a certain subject matter.5 When a statute includes an
express preemption clause, the language of that clause governs the pre-
emptive scope of the statute.6 Second, courts may imply congressional
intent to preempt state tort law in limited circumstances. 7
to include state law, "whether established by statute, ordinance, regulation, or court deci-
sion"); cf San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959) (stating
that "[state] regulation can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as
through some form of preventive relief").
4. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.1, at
319-20 (5th ed. 1995) (describing the analytical framework of federal legislative preemp-
tion).
5. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1994) (prohibiting additional or different state la-
beling requirements for chemicals with a federally approved label); 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)
(1994) (prohibiting state regulations of medical devices that is different from or in addition
to federal regulation); 21 U.S.C. § 678 (1994) (prohibiting state "[miarking, labeling, pack-
aging, or ingredient requirements in addition to, or different than, [federal require-
ments]"); 49 U.S.C. § 20106 (1994) (prohibiting state regulation of railroad safety in situa-
tions where the Secretary of Transportation already has prescribed such a regulation).
6. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993) ("If [a] statute con-
tains an express pre-emption clause, the task of statutory construction must in the first in-
stance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evi-
dence of Congress' pre-emptive intent."); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,
517 (1992) ("Congress's enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a stat-
ute implies that matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted.").
Disagreement exists as to whether courts, when faced with an express preemption
clause, should examine the substantive provisions of a statute to find implied preemption.
In Cipollone, the majority refused to apply an implied preemption analysis because the
Court was faced with an express preemption clause. See 505 U.S. at 517 (stating that
where Congress has enacted a provision defining the preemptive reach of a statute, mat-
ters beyond that reach are not preempted (citing California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n
v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282 (1987) (opinion of Marshall, J.)). In dissent, Justice Scalia
argued that courts still must apply an implied conflict preemption analysis in the face of an
express preemption clause. See id. at 547 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Scalia argued that if a court refuses to apply an implied conflict preemption
analysis when faced with an express preemption clause, that court will frustrate the pur-
pose of the clause. See id. By way of example, Justice Scalia explained that if a federal
law included a clause prohibiting any state-imposed workplace safety laws contradicting
federal safety laws, the courts could not find preemption of a state law that in fact imposes
a standard on workplace safety if that law had been enacted as a consumer protection law.
See id. Justice Scalia agreed with the majority that the courts should not apply an implied
field preemption analysis when faced with an express preemption clause. See id. Justice
Scalia reasoned that an express preemption clause contradicts any implication that Con-
gress intended to occupy a field broader than that defined in the clause. See id. See gener-
ally infra note 7 (discussing conflict preemption).
7. See Philip H. Corboy & Todd A. Smith, Federal Preemption of Product Liability
Law: Federalism and the Theory of Implied Preemption, 15 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 435,446
(1992). Courts may infer congressional intent to preempt state law in three situations. See
id. at 446-48. First, implied "field preemption" can result when Congress enacts compre-
hensive legislation governing every aspect of a certain subject matter. See id. at 446; see
[Vol. 47:721
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr
The principles of federalism and state sovereignty dictate that courts
construe statutory language with a presumption against preemption.'
The presumption is particularly strong when the subject matter of a fed-
eral statute relates to health or safety,9 areas that traditionally have been
left to the states. 10 Accordingly, unless Congress expresses a clear and
manifest purpose to preempt state tort law, courts will not find preemp-
tion."
also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983) (reasoning that states could not regulate safety aspects of nu-
clear power plants because "Congress' intent to supersede state law altogether may be
found from a 'scheme of federal regulation ... so pervasive as to make reasonable the in-
ference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it ... "') (quoting Fidelity
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,153 (1982)). Second, implied "con-
flict preemption" results when a direct conflict arises between state and federal law, so
that compliance with both laws is a "physical impossibility." See Corboy & Smith, supra,
at 447; see also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (stating that
where "Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over the matter in question,
state law is still pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law..."). But
see Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 775-76. Professor Gardbaum explains that all preemption
scenarios may be characterized as conflict cases. See id. at 775. He explains that in both
"express" and "implied" preemption scenarios, there is an actual conflict "between Con-
gress's... intent that there should be no state regulation" of a given field and state regula-
tory actions in that field. See id. at 775-76. The third type of implied preemption occurs
where a state law "stands as an obstacle" to federal law. See Corboy & Smith, supra, at
448. This Note does not discuss "stands as an obstacle" preemption.
8. See Corboy & Smith, supra note 7, at 448-49. The authors argue that courts
should be reluctant to find preemption of state laws because states are incapable of cor-
recting improper decisions while the federal government is free to correct improper judi-
cial decisions through congressional legislation. See id. at 449 (citing City of Burbank v.
Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 643 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
9. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("Congress legis-
lated here in a field which the States have traditionally occupied. So we start with the as-
sumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." (citations omit-
ted)). But cf Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 545 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part). Justice Scalia ar-
gued that courts should not give express preemption clauses the narrowest possible con-
struction. See id. Rather, Justice Scalia argued, when Congress has included an express
preemption clause in a statute, the assumption that the historic police powers of the states
are not to be superceded dissolves, and courts should apply ordinary principles of statu-
tory construction. See id. at 545-46 (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S.
374, 383 (1992)).
10. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2250 (1996); Corboy & Smith, supra
note 7, at 451.
11. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2250; cf New York State Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Dub-
lino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) ("'The exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be pre-
sumed."' (quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 203 (1952))); Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) ("The principle to be derived from our de-
cisions is that federal regulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive
of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the nature of
the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmis-
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The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA)12 exemplify federal
preemptive legislation in an area traditionally regulated by the states.13
Congress enacted the MDA following a rapid increase in reliance on
medical devices and a corresponding increase in the number of injuries
caused by device failure. 4 Prior to these 1976 amendments, the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA)"5 empowered the United
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to take regulatory action
regarding a medical device after the device appeared on the market and• 16
failed. In an effort to curb injuries, Congress enacted the MDA to en-
sure the safety of medical devices prior to entering the market 17 and to




12. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 21 U.S.C.) (amending the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No.
75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)).
13. See Bianca I. Truitt, Injured Consumers and the FDA: Should Federal Preemption
Protect Medical Device Manufacturers Under a Quasi-Governmental Immunity?, 15 J.
LEGAL MED. 155, 157 (1994) (noting that one of the goals of the MDA was to protect the
public).
14. See S. REP. No. 94-33, at 6-7 (1975) (noting that as of 1970, scientific literature
recorded more than 10,000 serious injuries associated with medical devices, including 731
deaths). In particular, the numerous deaths and miscarriages caused by the A.H. Robins
Company's Dalkon Shield intrauterine device prompted enactment of the MDA. See
Robert S. Adler & Richard A. Mann, Preemption and Medical Devices: The Courts Run
Amok, 59 Mo. L. REV. 895, 911-12 & n.84 (1994).
15. Pub. L. No. 675-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 301-395 (1994)). During the 1930s, concern over unsafe medical devices led reformers
to pressure for congressional legislation empowering the Food and Drug Administration
to protect the public against such devices. See S. REP. No. 94-33, at 2. During the era in
which the FDCA was enacted, most legitimate medical devices were simple enough that
doctors could determine easily whether a device was functioning properly. See id. at 2-3.
Legitimate devices available at that time included "surgical instruments, trusses, prosthetic
devices, ultraviolet lights, contraceptives, and orthopedic shoes." Id. at 2. With regard to
legitimate devices, the FDCA aimed to promote truth in labeling. See id. at 3. Early FDA
activity also included attempts to combat obviously dangerous devices such as lead nipple
shields. See id.
16. See Truitt, supra note 13, at 156-57.
17. See Robert Adler, The 1976 Medical Device Amendments: A Step in the Right Di-
rection Needs Another Step in the Right Direction, 43 FOOD DRUG COsM. L.J. 511, 511-12
(1988).
18. See Mark Herrmann & Geoffrey J. Ritts, Preemption and Medical Devices: A Re-
sponse to Adler and Mann, 51 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 1, 5-6 (1996). The first step leading to
the MDA was the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's sponsorship of the
"Study Group on Medical Devices," or Cooper Committee, formed in 1969. See James S.
Benson et al., The FDA's Regulation of Medical Devices: A Decade of Change, 43 FOOD
DRUG COSM. L.J. 495, 495 (1988). The Cooper Committee's purpose was to recommend
a strategy for developing standards for medical devices. See id. The Cooper Committee
concluded that federal regulation of medical devices was preferable to private or state
[Vol. 47:721
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To achieve the dual goals of protecting consumers and ensuring the
availability of new devices, Congress categorized medical devices ac-
cording to the risk posed to consumers and authorized the FDA to
promulgate corresponding regulatory controls.' 9 The FDA categorizes
devices that play a significant role in sustaining human life or preventing
impairment of human health as Class III devices and must, with one sig-
nificant exception,0 receive "premarket approval."'" To obtain premar-
ket approval, the manufacturer of a new device must demonstrate,
through clinical testing, that the device is safe and effective.
2
regulation because of funding, enforcement, and cohesiveness considerations. See id. at
496.
19. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c (1994) (designating three classes of devices and authorizing
the FDA to promulgate appropriate regulations). Class I devices are devices that: (1) the
manufacturer does not purport to be for use in sustaining human life or substantially pre-
venting impairment of health; and (2) do not present an unreasonable risk of injury. See
id. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(ii). The EPA subjects Class I devices only to the general controls
authorized by the MDA. See id. § 360c(a)(1)(A). Class II devices are devices for which
the general controls are insufficient to ensure safety and effectiveness, but sufficient in-
formation is available to impose performance standards to ensure the safety of the device.
See id. § 360c(a)(1)(B); see also Benson et al., supra note 18, at 495 (discussing the devel-
opment of standards and regulations under the MDA).
20. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (discussing an exception for new de-
vices that are substantially equivalent to devices on the market prior to the enactment of
the MDA). Another exception, the Investigational Device Exemption (IDE), promotes
the development of innovative medical devices by exempting them from the premarket
approval process. See 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g) (1994). Regulations promulgated pursuant to
§ 360j(g) establish procedures for device manufacturers to obtain an IDE. Manufacturers
seeking an IDE must submit an application to the FDA containing "[a] complete report of
prior investigations of the device," an "investigational plan," and detailed information on
the "manufacture, processing, packing, storage, and... installation of the device." 21
C.F.R. § 812.20(b)(1)-(3) (1997).
The investigational plan must include "the objectives and duration of the investigation;"
a description of the methodology to be used in the investigation; a written analysis of pro-
tocol demonstrating the scientific soundness of the investigation; an analysis of the risks to
subjects of the investigation; a description of each major "component, ingredient, prop-
erty, and principle of operation... and ... anticipated change[s] in the device"; monitor-
ing procedures; labeling for the device; and informed consent forms. Id. § 812.25(a)-(g).
The report of prior investigations must include evidence of all prior testing, a bibliography
of all publications, and a summary of unpublished information "relevant to an evaluation
of the safety or effectiveness of the device." Id. § 812.27. Based on the information in-
cluded in the application, the FDA will grant an IDE unless it determines that:
[t]here is reason to believe that the risks to the subjects are not outweighed by
the anticipated benefits to the subjects and the importance of the knowledge to
be gained, or informed consent is inadequate, or the investigation is scientifically
unsound, or there is reason to believe that the device as used is ineffective.
Id. § 812.30(b)(4).
21. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (1994).
22. See id. § 360c(a)(3)(A).
1998]
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The significant exception to the premarket approval requirement al-
lows new Class III devices that are "substantially equivalent" to a device
that was available prior to the enactment of the MDA to enter the mar-
ket through the "premarket notification" process.3 The premarket noti-
fication process, the purpose of which is to avoid creating a greater
regulatory burden for manufacturers of new devices, does not require the
manufacturer to demonstrate that the "substantially equivalent" device is
safe or effective.24
In addition to the "substantially equivalent" exception to the premar-
ket approval process, Congress included a preemption clause" in the
MDA to further encourage the development of new medical devices by
ensuring uniform regulation." In the Act's preemption clause, 21 U.S.C.
§ 360k, Congress prohibited states from creating or enforcing any re-
quirements regarding the safety or effectiveness of a MDA-regulated de-
vice that is different from or in addition to an existing FDA regulation.2'
23. See id. § 360e(b)(1).
24. See Benson et al., supra note 18, at 500 (noting that the MDA is "[d]esigned to
provide equity among manufacturers"); Adler, supra note 17, at 516 ("If the earlier device
poses a severe risk or is ineffective, then the later device may also be risky or ineffec-
tive."). The premarket notification process requires an average of 20 hours of FDA re-
view per device, while the premarket approval process requires an average of 1200 hours
per device. See Benson et al., supra note 18, at 500. Contrary to congressional intent, the
vast majority of Class III devices come to market via the premarket notification process.
See Adler, supra note 17, at 515-16. In 1990, for example, 80% of new Class III devices
were entering the market through the premarket notification process. See H.R. REP. No.
101-808, at 14 (1990).
Medical device manufacturers seeking to market their product through the premarket
notification process are required to submit a "Premarket Notification Summary" to the
FDA. See 21 C.F.R. § 807.92(a) (1997). The summary must contain the following: (1) the
name of the party seeking to market a new device, see id. § 807.92(a)(1); (2) the name of
the device legally marketed before May 28, 1976 (the effective date of the MDA) to which
the new device is equivalent, see id. § 807.92(a)(2); (3) the name of the new device, see id.
§ 807.92(a)(3); (4) a description of the new device such as would be found in the labeling
or promotional materials for the device, including how the device functions, the scientific
concepts that form the basis for the device, and the significant physical and performance
characteristics, such as the design, materials, and physical properties, see id. § 807.92(a)(4);
(5) a description of the diseases or conditions the device cures, treats, diagnoses, or pre-
vents, see id. § 807.92(a)(5); and (6) an explanation of the significant differences between
the new device and the pre-1976 device, see id. § 807.92(a)(6).
25. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994).
26. See Truitt, supra note 13, at 163 (noting that the uniformity of regulation which
follows from the preemption of state requirements minimizes the medical device indus-
try's compliance costs).
27. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994). This section prohibits any state requirement: "(1)
which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to
the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other
matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter." Id.
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Until 1992, when the Supreme Court held that the preemption clause
of a cigarette labeling statute barred certain tort claims against cigarette
companies,28 medical device manufacturers did not often assert a pre-
emption defense." Following this decision, medical device manufactur-
ers whose products allegedly caused injury to consumers began to assert
that the MDA preempted a victim's state tort claims because the claims,
if successful, would constitute state-imposed "requirements."3 The fed-
eral courts met the manufacturers' preemption arguments with varying
degrees of acceptance.3 In 1996, the United States Supreme Court
sought to clarify the preemptive scope of the MDA when it granted cer-
tiorari in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.32
Medtronic arose as the result of a failed pacemaker lead. In 1987, doc-
tors implanted a Medtronic pacemaker in Lora Lohr.33 Medtronic
equipped the pacemaker with its Model 4011 pacemaker lead,4 a Class
III medical device that came to market through the premarket notifica-
tion process as a device "substantially equivalent" to a pre-1976 device.35
In 1990, Ms. Lohr's pacemaker failed, necessitating emergency surgery to
save her life.36 According to Ms. Lohr's physician, a defect in the 4011
lead likely caused the pacemaker's failure.37
Claiming the manufacturer was liable based on both strict liability and
negligence theories, Ms. Lohr sued Medtronic in Florida state court.
28. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530-31 (1992) (holding that
state damage awards constitute requirements and are subject to preemption); see also infra
Part I.B. (discussing Cipollone).
29. See Adler & Mann, supra note 14, at 916 (noting that prior to Cipollone, courts
viewed compliance with federal government standards as a "weak shield" for defendants
accused of violating state laws).
30. See, e.g., English v. Mentor Corp., 67 F.3d 477, 480 (3d Cir. 1995) (penile im-
plant); Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1342 (11th Cir. 1995) (pacemaker), affd in
part and rev'd in part, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996); Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d
1330, 1334 (7th Cir. 1992) (intraocular lens).
31. See, eg., cases cited infra notes 115 and 117. See generally Adler & Mann, supra
note 14, at 916-23 (discussing the variant preemptive effect given to the MDA by the
courts).
32. 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996).
33. See id. at 2248.
34. See Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1340. A pacemaker lead is the wire that carries electrical
impulses from the pacemaker to the patient's heart tissues. See id.
35. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2248 (1996).
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id. The negligence claim alleged that Medtronic breached its "duty to use
reasonable care in the design, manufacture, assembly, and sale of the... pacemaker." Id.
Specifically, Lohr alleged that Medtronic used defective materials for the 4011 lead and
failed to warn or instruct the patient or her physician of the device's tendency to fail, not-
19981
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Medtronic removed the case to the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida and moved for summary judgment on both
counts, arguing that 21 U.S.C. § 360k 9 preempted such claims.40 The dis-
trict court originally denied Medtronic's motion for summary judgment;
but following a ruling by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the dis-
trict court reversed the earlier denial and dismissed Ms. Lohr's entire
complaint.4' The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
41cuit reversed in part and remanded in part. In Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc.,
the court of appeals held that § 360k did not preempt Ms. Lohr's negli-
gent design claims because the premarket notification process did not
impose federal requirements on the design of the 4011 lead.4'3 However,
the court of appeals, held that the section did preempt Ms. Lohr's negli-
gent manufacturing and labeling claims because of general manufactur-
ing and labeling requirements applicable to the pacemaker lead through
the MDA.4
withstanding Medtronic's awareness of previous failures. See id. The strict liability claim
alleged that the device was defective and posed an unreasonable hazard to users. See id.
Lohr's additional breach of warranty claim was dismissed for failure to state a claim under
Florida law. See id.
39. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing and quoting the provisions
of § 360k).
40. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2248.
41. See id. at 2249. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that § 360k preempted some, but not
all common law claims against medical device manufacturers. See Duncan v. Iolab Corp.,
12 F.3d 194, 195 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
42. See Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1352 (11th Cir. 1995), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996); Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330, 1334
(7th Cir. 1992) (intraocular lens).
43. See Lohr, 56 F.3d. at 1347-49. Central to the Eleventh Circuit's holding that
Lohr's negligent design claims survived preemption was the determination that premarket
approval alone neither represented a finding of safety or effectiveness nor imposed spe-
cific federal requirements on a device. See id. at 1348.
44. See id. at 1350. Finding the preemptive scope of § 360k unclear, the court turned
to the FDA regulation interpreting the section. See id. at 1343 (citing Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc., v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)). In Chevron, the Supreme Court held that
when a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific issue, an agency's construc-
tion of that statute is preferable to a judicial construction. See 467 U.S. at 843; see also in-
fra (discussing Chevron). The FDA regulation at issue provided that state requirements
be preempted only when there are specific federal regulations applicable to a device. See
21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1997). The Eleventh Circuit understood this provision to mandate
that a specific federal requirement be applicable to a device, rather than requiring a de-
vice-specific federal requirement in order to trigger preemption. See Lohr, 56 F.3d at
1345. Accordingly, the court reasoned that the good manufacturing practices applicable to
the 4011 pacemaker lead through the MDA, while not device-specific, were requirements
specific to the manufacturing of the device. See id. at 1350. Similarly, the court found that
the labeling requirements applicable to the device through the MDA were "quite specific
about what standards a manufacturer must follow when designing the packaging and la-
beling for its product." Id. at 1351.
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A plurality of the Supreme Court held that § 360k did not preempt any
of Ms. Lohr's claims.45 First, the plurality found that Congress did not in-
tend for the MDA to preempt all common law claims against medical
device manufacturers.4 ' Next, the plurality examined Ms. Lohr's claims
and found that each of them survived preemption because the claims, if
successful, would not have the effect of imposing requirements that were
different from or in addition to the federal regulations applicable specifi-
cally to the safety of the 4011 lead.4 '7 Finally, the plurality declined to de-
cide whether common law duties ever could impose "requirements" on a
device subject to preemption under § 360k.48 Justice Breyer concurred,
but emphasized that successful state common law claims do impose "re-
quirements" and that the MDA would preempt claims alleging that fed-
erally mandated conduct is negligent. 9
The dissent argued that the MDA did preempt Ms. Lohr's negligent
manufacturing and failure to warn claims." First, the dissent echoed Jus-
Chevron involved an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulation promulgated
under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977)
(Amendments). See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839. The Amendments required states that had
not met EPA air quality standards to devise a permit system to regulate major "stationary
sources" of pollution. See id. at 840. The EPA regulation at issue defined stationary
sources as all pollution-emitting devices within a single industrial grouping. See 40 C.F.R.
§§ 51.18(j)(1)(i)-(ii) (1983). As a result, industrial plants with multiple pollution sources
could modify one device without meeting permit requirements provided the total emis-
sions of the plant did not increase. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
When reviewing an agency's construction of a statute, the Court said that courts must
first look to whether Congress has directly addressed the question at issue. See id. at 842.
If Congress has directly addressed the question, the reviewing court and agency must defer
to the intent of Congress. See id. at 842-43. If Congress has not directly addressed the
question, the role of the court is to determine whether the agency's construction was
"based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id. at 843. See generally Cass R.
Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2091-92
(1990) (noting that Chevron does not indicate the degree of ambiguity a statute must have
to warrant judicial deference to an agency interpretation and suggesting that the mere ex-
istence of two reasonable interpretations is insufficient to trigger such deference). Exam-
ining the statutory language, the Court found that the only congressional intent discernible
from the ambiguous definition of "stationary sources" was an intent to enlarge the EPA's
discretion to define the term. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 862; see also Sunstein, supra, at
2086 (noting that the resolution of statutory ambiguities may involve questions of policy
and reiterating that agencies are better suited than courts to make such policy decisions).
Following similar reasoning, the Court found the EPA's construction of the amended Act
permissible. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
45. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2258.
46. See id. at 2251 (plurality opinion).
47. See id. at 2253-58.
48. See id. at 2258-59 (plurality opinion).
49. See id. at 2259 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
50. See id. at 2264 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and Thomas,
J.., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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tice Breyer's assertion that common law duties constitute requirements
within the meaning of § 360k." Next, the dissent maintained that the
language of § 360k did not warrant the plurality's requirement that a de-
vice specific federal regulation be applicable to the device to trigger pre-
emption. 2 Consequently, the dissent argued that federal manufacturing
and labeling requirements applicable to all medical devices preempted
Ms. Lohr's negligent manufacturing and failure to warn claims.53
This Note first traces the Supreme Court's approach to federal pre-
emption of state tort claims from 1984 to 1992, explaining the evolution
from the Court's refusal to find preemption of state tort claims absent an
exclusive federal remedy, to its finding that an award of damages result-
ing from a state tort claim was a form of direct state regulation subject to
preemption. This Note next examines the lower courts' variant interpre-
tations of the preemptive scope of the MDA with regard to state tort
claims. This Note then discusses the plurality, concurring, and dissenting
opinions in Medtronic. Finally, this Note argues that while the Medtronic
plurality correctly decided that the MDA did not preempt Ms. Lohr's
claims, the plurality failed to go far enough to prevent courts from find-
ing preemption of tort claims in situations that Congress never antici-
pated.
I. PREEMPTION AND STATE TORT CLAIMS IN THE SUPREME COURT
A. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.: No Preemption Without an Exclusive
Federal Remedy for Victims of Tortious Conduct
Prior to 1984, the Supreme Court had not considered whether federal
regulations that govern an actor's conduct could preempt state tort
claims when the regulations did not create an exclusive federal remedy.-
When faced with the issue, the Court found tort awards to be an insuffi-
ciently direct form of regulation to warrant preemption and demon-
strated an unwillingness to leave injured plaintiffs without any remedy
simply because federal law regulated the defendant's conduct.5
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee" involved an award of actual and punitive
damages under state common law tort principles for injuries that oc-
51. See id. at 2262.
52. See id. at 2263.
53. See id. at 2264.
54. See Lars Noah, Reconceptualizing Federal Preemption of Tort Claims As the Gov-
ernment Standards Defense, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 903, 907-08 (1996).
55. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 250-51 (1984).
56. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
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curred in a federally licensed nuclear facility operated by appellee Kerr-
McGee Corporation.7 Relying on the Court's prior holding that the
Atomic Energy Act58 (AEA) preempted all state regulation of safety as-
pects of nuclear facilities, 9 Kerr-McGee asserted that the AEA should
preempt the state damage award because it constituted a form of state
regulation in a prohibited field.0
Karen Silkwood, a laboratory analyst at a Kerr-McGee nuclear fuel
plant, became contaminated by plutonium radiation." Soon after her
contamination, Ms. Silkwood died as a result of an unrelated automobile
accident, and her father filed suit on behalf of her estate to recover for
62her injuries caused by the contamination. A jury awarded the Silkwood
estate actual and punitive damages.63 The Tenth Circuit reversed the
jury's punitive damages award, holding that the AEA preempted the
award.6,
Upon review, the Supreme Court focused on Congress's failure to ad-
dress preemption of state tort claims in the AEA and on the absence of
•• 65
federal remedies for injuries incurred in a nuclear facility. The Court
understood Congress's failure to mention that it intended the AEA to
extinguish all nuclear accident victims' state law claims as an indication
that Congress did not intend to preclude the availability of such reme-
dies.6 The Court then examined the attention given to tort liability in an
57. See id. at 243-45.
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2284 (1994).
59. See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 240-41 (citing Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy
Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 211-13 (1983)). In Pacific Gas &
State Electric, the Court implied congressional intent to preempt state law. See 461 U.S.
190, 212-13. The Court found that Congress intended for the federal government to oc-
cupy completely the field of nuclear safety. See id. at 212; see also supra note 7 and ac-
companying text (discussing the variant forms of implied preemption theory).
60. See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 249. Kerr-McGee argued that a state-authorized dam-
ages award would deter and punish improper conduct related to nuclear safety and, there-
fore, the AEA preempted such an award. See id.
61. See id. at 241.
62. See id. at 242-43.
63. See id. at 245. The jury awarded the Silkwood estate $505,000 in actual damages
and $10 million in punitive damages. See id.
64. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 667 F.2d 908, 923 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464
U.S. 238 (1984). The Tenth Circuit also reversed the majority of the actual damages
awarded, holding that the state Workers' Compensation Act provided the estate with its
sole remedy. See id. at 920.
65. See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 249.
66. See id. at 251 (citing United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347
U.S. 656, 663-64 (1954)).
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amendment to the AEA, the Price-Anderson Act,67 which limited the
amount of damages that could be awarded in the event of a nuclear acci-
dent.6 While the Price-Anderson Act did not actually apply to the facil-
ity in question,69 the Court found the Act indicative of Congress's lack of
intent for the AEA to preempt tort claims.
The Court also addressed Kerr-McGee's attempt to distinguish actual
and punitive damages and Kerr-McGee's assertion that Congress in-
tended to preempt at least the latter, if not the former.71 The Court re-
jected the corporation's argument.72 The Court explained that punitive
damages were a traditional part of state damage awards.73 The Court de-
termined that Congress did not intend the AEA to preempt traditional
state tort principles unless it did so expressly,74 and the Court found no
indication of such an intent in the legislative history or regulations.75 In
an amicus curiae brief, the United States argued that the AEA should
preempt punitive damage awards because the AEA authorizes the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission to impose civil penalties for violations of
federal standards.76  The Court rejected this argument, reasoning that
67. Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
68. See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251.
69. See id. The Act applied only to facilities that were required to maintain financial
protection and were therefore eligible for federal indemnification. See id. at 251 n.12.
Plutonium processing plants such as the plant in Silkwood were not required to maintain
financial protection until 1977. See id. at 252 n.12 (citing 42 Fed. Reg. 46 (1977)).
70. See id. at 251-52. The Court examined the Joint Committee Report on the origi-
nal Price-Anderson Act and found that Congress intended for the Act to interfere with
state tort law only when the damage awards of state courts exceeded the federal limitation
on liability. See id. at 252 (quoting S. REP. No. 85-296, at 9 (1957)).




75. See id. The Court placed the burden of proving that Congress intended to pre-
clude punitive awards on Kerr-McGee. See id. (citing International Bhd. Elec. Workers v.
Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 53 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the result)). Kerr-McGee failed
to point to any evidence either in the legislative history or in the regulations indicating
that punitive damages should be precluded. See id. Rather, the Court found that the
regulations implementing the Price-Anderson Act indicated that punitive damages could
still be awarded under state law. See id. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission published
its nuclear energy liability policies and indemnity agreements where it recited the waivers
being exercised by the facility operators. See id. at 255 n.17. The publication provided
that the waivers did not apply to punitive damages. See id. (quoting 10 C.F.R. § 140.91,
Appendix A, para. 2(c), at 801 (1983)). The Court concluded that, had there been any ex-
isting federal law prohibiting state punitive damages awards, the provision stating that the
waivers do not apply to such awards would not have been necessary. See id.
76. See id. at 257.
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Kerr-McGee could be required to pay federal fines as well as state-
imposed punitive damage awards arising out of the same incident."
Next, the Court addressed Kerr-McGee's argument that allowing states
to award punitive damages would frustrate the express goal of the AEA,
to promote atomic energy.78 The Court responded by noting that the Act
was primarily intended to protect the health and safety of the public from
the dangers of atomic energy production, and that the goal of protecting
health and safety encompassed the goal of promoting atomic energy.79
For this reason, the Court held that punitive awards did not hinder the
goal of the Act.8°
In dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that courts should bifurcate the is-
sues of punitive and compensatory damages because punitive damages
serve to regulate safety while compensatory damages serve to compen-
sate victims.8' Justice Blackmun reasoned that, because the Court's
holding in Pacific Gas & Electric82 dictated that state regulation of nu-




79. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2013(d) (1994)).
80. See id.
81. See id. at 263 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part).
82. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
83. See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 263-64 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part). In English v.
General Elec. Co., the Court again rejected a preemption defense where a state tort claim
arose out of incidents occurring at a nuclear facility. See 496 U.S. 72, 90 (1990). Peti-
tioner, Vera English, filed a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
because of retaliatory treatment she received from her employer, General Electric, fol-
lowing her report of safety violations to federal authorities. See id. at 74-77. The Court
began its discussion of the case with a field preemption analysis and held that the state
damage award at issue would not have a sufficiently direct or substantial effect on safety
matters at nuclear facilities to fall within the preempted field. See id. at 85. The Court
noted the incongruity that would result if it found that tort awards based on retaliation
against "whistle-blowers" were preempted when the Court previously held in Silkwood
that the AEA did not preempt tort awards based on actual safety violations. See id. at 86.
The Court next addressed the issue of whether an actual conflict with federal law would
result if it allowed the state damage award to stand. See id. at 87. Contrary to the situa-
tion in Silkwood, in English, the AEA created a federal remedy for victims of retaliatory
actions resulting from reports of safety violations. See id. The Secretary of Labor is
authorized to compensate the victims of employer retaliation where the employer is moti-
vated by reports of safety violations. See 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(2)(13) (1982). The Court
rejected General Electric's contention that the existence of a federal remedy caused an
inevitable conflict with state tort awards. See English, 496 U.S. at 88. The Court found
that state causes of action need not be preempted solely because the state imposes liability
greater than that which the federal law imposes. See id. at 89 (citing California v. ARC
Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 105 (1989)).
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B. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.: State Tort Awards Constitute
Regulations Subject to Preemption
In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,84 the Supreme Court, in a plurality
opinion authored by Justice Stevens, sharply curtailed its inclination pre-
viously demonstrated in Silkwood to preserve state law claims in the face
of expansive federal regulation." The Court's new willingness to find
preemption of state tort claims resulted from its belief that tort damage
awards were a form of direct state regulation."
In Cipollone, the Court addressed the issue of whether either of two
federal statutes regulating the packaging and advertising of cigarettes
preempted common law tort claims against a cigarette manufacturer. 
8
Based on the reasoning that Congress's inclusion of an express preemp-
tion clause prevented the Court from conducting an implied preemption
analysis, the Court focused solely on the language of the preemption
clause in each statute. 8
The preemption clause in the first federal statute prohibited the states
from requiring cigarette manufacturers to include any information re-
garding the health implications of smoking in any cigarette advertise-
ments or packages when the advertising or packaging already complied
with federal law.89 The Court found that the preemptive language of this
first statute did no more than prohibit states from mandating that ciga-
84. 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (plurality opinion).
85. See Noah, supra note 54, at 913 (noting the Cipollone Court's departure from the
reasoning of Silkwood).
86. See id. at 925 (discussing the Cipollone Court's reasoning as to the regulatory ef-
fect of tort damages awards).
87. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 508. Compare Federal Cigarette Labeling and Adver-
tising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 5(a), 79 Stat. 282, 283 (1965) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1334 (1994)) (requiring a warning on cigarette packages that "Smoking May Be
Hazardous to Your Health) (emphasis added), with Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act
of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 5, 84 Stat. 87, 88 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1334 (1994)) (requiring a warning that "Cigarette Smoking Is dangerous to Your
Health") (emphasis added).
88. See Cipolone, 505 U.S. at 517 ("Congress' enactment of a provision defining the
pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not pre-
empted."). The Court acknowledged that the legislative history of the 1969 Act indicated
that Congress was primarily concerned with positive enactments of state law. See id. at
521. The Court, however, refused to give the statute less preemptive effect than the plain
language dictated based on the statute's legislative history. See id. (citing S. REP. No. 91-
566, at 12 (1969)).
89. See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act § 5(a)-(b). The 1965 Act
provided that "[n]o statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the ad-
vertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provi-
sions of this Act." Id. § 5(b) (emphasis added).
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rette manufacturers include additional warning statements on their pack-
ages or in their advertising.9
In contrast, the second federal statute contained broader language in
its preemption clause, which the Court deemed to indicate that Congress
intended to preempt common law damages actions.91 The second statute
prohibited states from imposing requirements or prohibitions relating to
the advertising or promotion of cigarettes properly labeled under federal
law?9 After an evaluation of the nature of common law tort damage
awards, the Court concluded that the phrase "requirements or prohibi-
tions" easily encompassed such common law rules.93
In a separate opinion joined by Justices Kennedy and Souter,94 Justice
Blackmun dissented from the plurality's finding that the Acts preempted
any common law claims.9 Justice Blackmun argued that where, as in the
second federal statute, Congress spoke directly to the issue of preemp-
tion, the Court should not extend the preemptive scope of a statute fur-
ther than Congress unambiguously provided for in the specific wording
of the preemption clause.96 In Justice Blackmun's opinion, the language
of the second federal statute was not sufficiently unambiguous to over-
come the presumption against preemption dictated by principles of fed-
eralism and state sovereignty. 97 Justice Blackmun found the disparate
preemptive effect that the plurality gave to the two statutes "little short
of baffling."98
Finally, Justice Blackmun noted that, traditionally, the Court had been
reluctant to hold that a state tort claim is preempted when federal law
does not create an alternative remedy. 99 Justice Blackmun argued that
90. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518.
91. See id. at 521-22.
92. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act § 5(b) ("No requirement or prohibition
based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the adver-
tising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with
the provisions of this Act.") (emphasis added).
93. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 522 ("[I]t is the essence of the common law to enforce
duties that are either affirmative requirements or negative prohibitions."). Justice Stevens
evaluated each claim, finding preemption where the legal duty predicating the common
law damages action constituted a requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health
imposed under state law. See id. at 523-30.
94. See id. at 531-44 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part).
95. See id. at 531.
96. See id. at 533.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 534.
99. See id. at 541.
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Congress would not intentionally eliminate the only judicial source of
compensation for the victims of cigarette manufacturers' illegal conduct
without expressly mentioning common law causes of action in the pre-
emption clause of the statute.'M
Justice Scalia dissented from the plurality's holding,01 arguing that the
plurality erred when it narrowly construed the preemptive scope of the
statutes.12 In light of Congress's clearly expressed intent to preempt
state law, Justice Scalia argued that, as a test for preemption, the Court
should consider whether the law resulting from a common law damages
award "practically compels" manufacturers to act in a way that the stat-
ute prohibits states from requiring directly. 13
Only one year later, in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood,' 4 the
Supreme Court again found that a federal statute expressly preempted a
state tort claim where there was no mention of common law rules in the
statute's preemption clause. The Court held that the Federal Railroad
Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA)1 °6 preempted state tort claims where federal
regulations governed a particular aspect of train safety.
l°7
A train owned by CSX Transportation killed Thomas Easterwood
when it struck his vehicle at a railway crossing. 108 His widow filed a
wrongful-death suit against CSX under state law alleging negligence for
"failing to maintain adequate warning devices" and "operating the train
at an excessive speed."'09 The Court found that the FRSA did not pre-
100. See id. at 542.
101. See id. at 544 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Scalia also argued that the first federal statute preempted Cipollone's failure
to warn claims. See id.
102. See id. Justice Scalia argued that the role of the Court is "to interpret Congress's
decrees of preemption neither narrowly nor broadly, but in accordance with their appar-
ent meaning." Id.
103. See id. at 555.
104. 507 U.S. 658 (1993).
105. See id. at 664; see also Noah, supra note 54, at 920 (discussing the Court's decision
in Easterwood).
106. Pub. L. No. 91-458, 84 Stat. 971 (1970) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§§ 20101-201,53 (1994)).
107. See Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 664 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S.
504, 522 (1992)). The Act provided that: "[a] State may adopt or continue in force any
law, rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety until such time as the
Secretary [of Transportation] has adopted a rule, regulation, order, or standard covering
the subject matter of such State requirement." Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 § 205
(1970).
108. See Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 661.
109. Id.
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empt Mrs. Easterwood's state claim regarding warning devices because
the warning devices at the crossing were not federally regulated. l
The Court did find, however, that the FRSA preempted Mrs. Easter-
wood's claim based on excessive speed."' Regulations promulgated un-
der the FRSA prescribe maximum speed limits for all trains, according to
the class of track on which they travel."2 Mrs. Easterwood argued that
Congress intended the speed regulation to prevent derailments, rather
than to promote safety at grade crossings, and, as a result, the speed
regulation should not act to preempt her negligence claim."3 The Court
rejected this argument, finding that the FRSA required preemption of
state tort claims where a federal regulation has been promulgated cov-
ering the subject matter of the claim, regardless of the Department of
Transportation's purpose for the regulation.
II. PREEMPTION UNDER THE MEDICAL DEVICE AMENDMENTS AFTER
CIPOLLONE
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Cipollone, manufacturers did
not often raise preemption defenses in the context of the Medical Device
Amendments."5 The paucity of preemption defenses was most likely the
110. Seeid.at672.
111. See id. at 676.
112. See 49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a) (1996). Although the train that struck Mr. Easterwood
was traveling below the regulation's 60 mile per hour speed limit, Mrs. Easterwood con-
tended that CSX breached a common law duty to operate the train at a safe speed. See
Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 673.
113. See Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 675.
114. See id.; supra note 107 (providing the preemptive language of the Federal Rail-
road Safety Act).
115. See Adler & Mann, supra note 14, at 916. Some courts found that the MDA did
not preempt any state tort claims. See, e.g., Callan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 709 F. Supp. 662,
668 (D. Md. 1989) (intrauterine device); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp.
1293, 1300 (D. Minn. 1988) (intrauterine device); Larsen v. Pacesetter Sys., Inc., 837 P.2d
1273, 1282 (Haw.) (pacemaker), reh'g granted and opinion amended by 843 P.2d 144 (Haw.
1992); Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1233 (Kan. 1987) (intrauterine device).
Other courts have held that the MDA preempted some state tort claims. See Adler &
Mann, supra note 14, at 916. See, e.g., Bejarano v. International Playtex, Inc., 750 F. Supp.
443, 446 (D. Idaho 1990) (tampons); Desmarais v. Dow Corning Corp., 712 F. Supp. 13,
15-16 (D. Conn. 1989) (breast implants; finding that § 360k preempts labeling and warning
claims but preserving plaintiff's claims because the plaintiff received the implants prior to
enactment of the MDA); Rinehart v. International Playtex, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 475, 477-78
(S.D. Ind. 1988) (tampons; holding that the MDA preempted plaintiffs labeling and
warning claims if the manufacturer complied with FDA requirements but preserving de-
sign claims); Stewart v. International Playtex, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 907, 910 (D.S.C. 1987)
(tampons); Berger v. Personal Prods., Inc., 797 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Wash. 1990) (en banc)
(tampons).
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result of the courts' previous reluctance to find that federal regulation of
a certain field preempted state tort claims, as evidenced by Silkwood.16
Since Cipollone, courts have seen preemption defenses raised in the
medical device context much more frequently, often finding that the
MDA preempt state tort claims."7 Although some courts have ruled that
the MDA do not preempt any state tort claims, others have held that the
MDA preempt all tort claims, and the majority of courts have found that
the MDA preempt at least some tort claims against manufacturers of
regulated devices.""
A. King v. Collagen Corp.: The MDA Preempt All Tort Claims Against
Manufacturers of Regulated Devices
In King v. Collagen Corp.,"9 the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit held that the MDA preempted all state tort claims based
116. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 249 (1984). Notwithstanding
the holding of Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Cons. & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983), that the Atomic Energy Act preempted states from regulating
safety aspects of nuclear power plants, the Silkwood Court held that a law intended to pro-
tect the public does not preempt state tort claims without mention, and without creating
an alternative federal remedy. See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251; see also supra Part I.A. (dis-
cussing the Supreme Court's decision in Silkwood).
117. See, e.g., Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540, 546 (3d Cir. 1994) (intra-
ocular lens); Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 16-20 (1st Cir. 1994) (pacemaker);
Hinners v. Optical Radiation Corp., 15 F.3d 1096, 1096 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (in-
traocular lens); Duncan v. Iolab Corp., 12 F.3d 194, 195 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (in-
traocular lens); Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1424 (5th Cir. 1993) (anti-wrinkle
treatment); King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1137 (1st Cir. 1993) (anti-wrinkle
treatment); Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330, 1333 (7th Cir. 1992) (intra-
ocular lens); Griffin v. Medtronic, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 396, 398 (D. Md. 1994) (pacemaker);
Kemp v. Pfizer, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1015, 1025 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (heart valve); Reiter v.
Zimmer, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 199, 203-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (bone cement); Covey v. Surgidev
Corp., 815 F. Supp. 1089, 1096 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (intraocular lens). But see Ginochio v.
Surgikos, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 948, 950 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (finding no preemption of state tort
claims under the MDA); Oliver v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 251, 253 (W.D.
Pa. 1994) (prosthetic knee device; requiring counterpart requirements promulgated under
the MDA to trigger preemption); Mulligan v. Pfizer, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 633, 635 (S.D. Ohio
1994) (finding no preemption of state tort claims under MDA); Elbert v. Howmedica, Inc.,
841 F. Supp. 327, 332 (D. Haw. 1993) (artificial knee); Lamontagne v. E.I. DuPont de Ne-
mours & Co., 834 F. Supp. 576, 586 (D. Conn. 1993) (dental prosthesis), affd, 41 F.3d 846
(2d Cir. 1994); Evraets v. Intermedics Intraocular, Inc., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 852, 855 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1994) (intraocular lens; finding no preemption of state tort claims under the MDA);
Larsen v. Pacesetter Sys., Inc., 837 P.2d 1273, 1282 (Haw. 1992) (pacemaker; finding no
preemption of state tort claims under the MDA). See generally Adler & Mann, supra note
14, at 916-17 (criticizing the increase in successful preemption defenses after Cipollone).
118. See Adler & Mann, supra note 14, at 916-17; see also supra note 117 (listing cases
where courts found preemption).
119. 983 F.2d 1130 (1st Cir. 1993).
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on injuries caused by a regulated device.'20 Jane King received an injec-
tion of Zyderm,12' a Class III medical device manufactured by Collagen
Corporation, which, she alleged, caused her to develop an autoimmune
disease. 2 Ms. King filed a complaint alleging seven claims arising out of
the Zyderm treatment.' 3
The First Circuit modeled its preemption analysis after the Supreme
Court's analysis in Cipollone. 24  The First Circuit focused solely on
§ 360k of the MDA,' which defined the statute's preemptive scope, and
held that the existence of such a section precluded an implied preemp-
tion analysis.12 6 Section 360k prohibited state "requirement[s]" different
from or in addition to FDA requirements for a device. The court
looked to the FDA's own interpretation of the preemptive scope of the
MDA for guidance.' Based upon the FDA's interpretation, the FirstS129
Circuit found § 360k to include court-imposed requirements.
Having determined that Congress intended § 360k to preempt state re-
quirements imposed by court decisions, the First Circuit analyzed each of
Ms. King's claims to decide whether any claim would impose a new sub-
stantive requirement on a device in an area the FDA had already regu-
lated.' Because Zyderm actually passed the rigorous premarket ap-
proval process, 3' the court found that the FDA had regulated all aspects
120. See id. at 1131.
121. See id. at 1132. Zyderm treatments involve the injection of processed cow tissue
directly into the patient's skin to smooth wrinkles. See id at 1131.
122. See id. at 1132. The disease, dermatomyositis/polymyositis, causes a person's im-
mune system to attack the skin and muscles of the person as if those tissues were a foreign
substance. See id.
123. See id. The claims were strict liability, breach of implied warranty of merchant-
ability, negligence, misbranding and/or mislabeling, misrepresentation, failure to warn,
and fraud. See id.
124. See id. at 1133.
125. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (1994). This section prohibits any state requirement: "(1) which
is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the
device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other
matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter." Id.
126. See King, 983 F.2d at 1134.
127. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k; see also supra note 125 for the text of this provision.
128. See King, 983 F.2d at 1134.
129. See id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b) (1997), which provides that prohibited state
requirements include state requirements emanating from court decisions). But cf. Med-
tronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2258 (1996) (plurality opinioin) (stating that require-
ments emanating from court decisions as referred to in § 808.1(b) encompass only courts'
interpretations of positive enactments of law).
130. See King, 983 F.2d at 1135.
131. See id. at 1132. Zyderm was also subject to revisionary requirements after the
FDA granted the original approval. See id.
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of the safety, effectiveness, labeling, and manufacture of the device.12
Thus, any successful claim against the manufacturer of the device would
constitute an additional state requirement and, therefore, would be pre-
empted.'33
B. Feldt v. Mentor Corp.: The MDA Preempt Some Tort Claims Against
Manufacturers of Regulated Devices
In Feldt v. Mentor Corp.,134 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that the MDA preempted state failure to warn claims
but permitted state design defect claims.'35 Sam Feldt was the recipient
of a GFS penile prosthesis, a Class III device manufactured by the Men-
tor Corporation.36 Less than three years after the implantation of the
device in Mr. Feldt, the device ceased to function.'37 Mr. Feldt sued Men-
tor claiming, inter alia, failure to warn and defective design. 38
The Fifth Circuit began its preemption analysis with the presumption
that the state law duties behind Mr. Feldt's claims constituted require-
ments relating to the safety and effectiveness of the GFS 39 The court
132. See id. at 1135-36. The First Circuit found that the MDA preempted King's strict
liability claim. See id. at 1135. The court held that by granting premarket approval, the
FDA had determined Zyderm to be safe and effective for the device's intended purpose.
See id. The court explained that to impose strict liability on the corporation would be to
impose additional state requirements relating to the safety and effectiveness of the device.
See id. With regard to King's breach of express warranty claims, the court found the
MDA preempted such claims because they arose directly from the labeling and packaging
of the device. See id. The court held that the MDA also preempted King's breach of im-
plied warranty of merchantability claim because such a claim arose out of state contract
law and also would impose additional state requirements on the device. See id. at 1135-36.
The court found all of King's negligence claims to relate to the design, manufacture, and
labeling of the device, and therefore held that the MDA preempted such claims. See id. at
1136. Furthermore, the court found that the MDA preempted King's claim based on
product misbranding, misrepresentation, and failure to warn. See id. The court reasoned
that FDA approval of a product's labeling constitutes a determination that the labeling is
not false or misleading. See id. Absent allegations that Collagen failed to use FDA-
approved packaging and labeling, any such claim would impose additional or different re-
quirements on the device than those imposed by the FDA. See id. All of King's remain-
ing claims were dismissed for similar reasons. See id.
133. See id. at 1135-36.
134. 61 F.3d 431 (5th Cir.), vacated, Mentor Corp. v. Feldt, 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996).
135. See id. at 438.
136. See id. at 432-33.
137. See id. at 432. After the initial failure, the device had to be removed and re-
placed. See id. Feldt claimed that the defect in the device caused him embarrassment and
trauma, and contributed to the termination of his engagement. See id.
138. See id. at 433 n.1. Feldt's claims also included negligence, strict liability, breach of
warranty, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. See id. at 432-33.
139. See id. at 434.
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therefore limited its inquiry to determining whether the MDA imposed
any requirements on the GFS penile prosthesis.' ° In contrast to the de-
vice at issue in King v. Collagen Corp.,t the GFS was not subjected to
the rigorous premarket approval process. 142 Instead, the FDA allowed
the device to enter the market through the premarket notification proc-
ess because Mentor demonstrated that the prosthesis was substantially
equivalent to a device on the market prior to the enactment of the
MDA.
143
The court first addressed Mr. Feldt's argument that the premarket no-
tification process did not invoke § 360k preemption.1" The court rejected
this argument because it found, based on its earlier holding in Reeves v.
, 141
AcroMed Corp. , that: (1) the existence of any federal requirement trig-
gers a preemption analysis; and (2) that the premarket notification proc-
ess imposes requirements on a device, including labeling and warning re-. 146
quirements. As a result, the court held that the MDA preempted
140. See id. (citing Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1421 (5th Cir. 1993) (ex-
plaining the Fifth Circuit test for § 360k preemption)).
141. 983 F.2d 1130 (1st Cir. 1993).
142. See Feldt, 61 F.3d at 434.
143. See id. See generally supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (discussing the
premarket notification process).
144. See Feldt, 61 F.3d at 434-36. Feldt argued that the regulations applicable to the
device through the premarket notification process were intended to "identif[y] and clas-
sif[y]" the device, rather than promote its safety, and therefore should not "be construed
as federal requirements within the meaning of section 360k." Id. at 435.
145. 44 F.3d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding preemption of a failure-to-warn claim
against the manufacturer of a Class III device that entered the market through the pre-
market notification process), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1104 (1995). In Reeves, a neurosurgeon
"implanted metal bone plates and screws manufactured by AcromMed" in Dorothy
Reeves' back to facilitate fusion of her vertebrae. Id. at 302. Six months after the surgery,
Reeves experienced severe back pain. See id. Reeves filed suit alleging that AcroMed's
metal bone implant had broken and, thus, prevented her spine from fusing. See id. In-
cluded in Reeves' complaint was a claim that AcroMed failed to warn her that the FDA
had approved the metal bone implant for use in the spine only as part of an experimental
study. See id. Based on Reeves' failure-to-warn claim, a jury awarded her $475,000. See
id. at 302.
Like the GFS, the AcroMed bone implant entered the market through the premarket
notification process. See id. at 305. The Reeves court acknowledged that completion of
the premarket notification process does not constitute official FDA approval of a device.
See id. The premarket notification process, however, does involve extensive FDA scrutiny
and approval of the labeling of the device. See id. Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
because the FDA had promulgated requirements on the labeling of the AcroMed device
within the meaning of § 360k, Reeves' failure-to-warn claim was preempted. See id.
146. See Feldt, 61 F.3d at 435 (citing Reeves, 44 F.3d at 305). In 21 C.F.R. § 801.109(c)
(1997), the FDA requires all Class III device labeling to contain (1) usage information,
"including indications, effects, routes, methods, and frequency and duration of administra-
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Feldt's failure-to-warn claim.47
Noting that the existence of some FDA requirements applicable to the
GFS did not necessarily preclude all of Mr. Feldt's claims,48 the court
then considered the preemption of claims based on defective design.
49
The court found that the premarket notification process did not consti-
tute an affirmation by the FDA of the safety or effectiveness of the GFS
design.50 Accordingly, the court held that the MDA did not preempt Mr.
Feldt's defective design claims. 5'
C. Kennedy v. Collagen Corp.: No Preemption of State Tort Claims
under the MDA
In sharp contrast to the First Circuit's holding in King, the Ninth Cir-
cuit, in Kennedy v. Collagen Corp.,'52 held that the MDA did not preempt
any tort claims against the manufacturer of a Class III device. 3 Con-
trary to the courts finding preemption of tort claims under the MDA, the
Ninth Circuit understood the FDA's interpretation of the preemptive
scope of the MDA to preserve all state tort claims.5 4 In Kennedy, as in
King, the state tort claims arose when the plaintiff suffered injuries from
a Zyderm collagen implant, a Class III medical device.'55
The Ninth Circuit found that Congress's preemptive language was am-
biguous and, therefore, looked to the FDA regulation defining the pre-
emptive scope of § 360k for assistance. The FDA regulation preserved
state requirements of "general applicability,' 57 which, the court con-
tion," and (2) warning information including, "relevant hazards, contraindications, side
effects, and precautions." 21 C.F.R. § 801.109(c) (1997). Premarket notification submis-
sions are screened for compliance with the labeling requirements. See id. § 807.87(e).
147. See Feldt, 61 F.3d at 436.
148. See id. (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 523-28 (1992)).
149. See id.
150. See id. at 437. The court found that the MDA's General Manufacturing Princi-
ples, applicable to all Class III devices, do not impose requirements on the design of the
devices. See id.
151. See id. at 437-38. The court deemed Feldt's claim of breach of implied warranty
of merchantability to encompass a defective design claim. See id. at 436-37.
152. 67 F.3d 1453 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2579 (1996).
153. See id. at 1458-59.
154. See id. at 1460.
155. See id. at 1454-55; see also supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text (discussing
the Zyderm treatment and associated injuries).
156. See Kennedy, 67 F.3d. at 1457. "As long as the FDA has propounded any 'rea-
sonable interpretation' of the provision, this Court has no cause to overturn the agency's
interpretation in favor of its own." Id. (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325
U.S. 410, 414 (1945)).
157. See 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1997).
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cluded, encompassed common law claims."' The court also found that
the premarket approval process was not a "specific requirement ... ap-
plicable to a particular device."1 9  Holding otherwise, the court ex-
plained, would result in federal preemption of all state tort claims against
manufacturers of devices with premarket approval, and leave the injured
party without any remedy.' 6 In light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Silkwood and Congress's stated purpose for enacting the MDA, con-
161
sumer protection, the Ninth Circuit held that the MDA did not pre-
empt tort claims against manufacturers of devices that had received pre-
162
market approval.
III. MEDTRONIC, INC. V. LOHR: SHRINKING THE PREEMPTION SHIELD
FOR MANUFACTURERS OF "SUBSTANTIALLY EQUIVALENT" DEVICES
The Supreme Court seized the opportunity presented by Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr'63 to define the extent to which the MDA preempt state
common law claims.' 6 In Medtronic, Lora Lohr sought to recover for
injuries allegedly caused by the failure of Medtronic's Model 4011 pace-
maker lead, claiming negligent design, negligent manufacture, and failure
to warn.165 The 4011 pacemaker lead, a Class III medical device, came to
market through the premarket notification process because the FDA
deemed it "substantially equivalent" to a device marketed prior to the
enactment of the MDA.' 66 After convincing the FDA that the 4011 lead
was substantially equivalent to an existing device, Medtronic needed to
comply only with the general federal regulations applicable to all medical
158. See Kennedy, 67 F.3d at 1459. The court reasoned that, although common law
claims arise as a response to an injury caused by a particular device, "state common law
does not relate solely to or regulate any particular device or product to the exclusion of
other devices or products." Id. Additionally, the court explained, unlike positive enact-
ments of state law, defendants in common law damages actions have the ability to decide
how to respond to an unfavorable judgment. See id.
159. Id. The court reasoned that, because all Class III devices must obtain premarket
approval before reaching the public market, premarket approval alone does not constitute
a "specific requirement" under 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1997). See id. (emphasis omitted).
160. See id.
161. See id. (citing 43 Fed. Reg. 18,663 (1978)).
162. See id. at 1459-60. The court distinguished the purpose of direct state regulation--
to govern the actions of manufacturers before releasing their products to the public--and
the purpose of state common law damages actions--to provide compensation for injured
consumers. See id. at 1459. Thus, the court reasoned, Congress did not intend to preempt
common law damages actions with an Act designed to protect consumers. See id.
163. 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996).
164. See id. at 2250.
165. See id. at 2248.
166. See id.
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devices, including Good Manufacturing Practices and labeling require-
ments.'67
The Federal District Court for the Middle District of Florida found
that § 360k preempted all counts of Ms. Lohr's complaint and dismissed
the case. 68 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
reversed in part and remanded in part. 69 The court concluded that the
MDA did not preempt Ms. Lohr's negligent design claims because the
premarket notification process did not impose federal requirements on
the design of the 4011 lead. 70 The court found, however, that the MDA
167. See id. at 2256. The Good Manufacturing Practices impose duties on medical de-
vice manufacturers such as instituting a quality assurance program; maintaining an ade-
quate organizational structure to ensure that workers who come in contact with a device
are clean, healthy, and suitably dressed; providing sufficient personnel training; and having
adequate buildings and environmental controls to ensure a safe product. See id. at 2256
n.17 (citing 21 C.F.R. §§ 820.5, 820.20, 820.25, 820.40, 820.46, 820.60 (1997)).
168. See id. at 2249.
169. See Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1352 (11th Cir. 1995), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996). The only issue on appeal was whether the district court
properly held that § 360k preempted all state common law tort claims against the manu-
facturer of a Class III medical device that arrived on the market via the premarket notifi-
cation process. See id. at 1341. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals began its discus-
sion by analyzing the preemptive scope of § 360k. See id. at 1342. Prior to hearing
Medtronic, the Eleventh Circuit, in Duncan v. lolab Corp., 12 F.3d 194, 195 (11th Cir.
1994), adopted the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961
F.2d 1330, 1331 (7th Cir. 1992), that the term "state requirement" in § 360k encompasses
state common law damages actions. See Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1342. To determine the type of
requirements that must be applicable to a device under the MDA to trigger preemption,
the Eleventh Circuit turned to the FDA's preemption regulations because it found Con-
gress's language ambiguous. See id. at 1344. Relying on the FDA's preemption regula-
tions, 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d), the court concluded that a federal requirement must be specifi-
cally applicable to a particular device in order to trigger preemption. See id.
170. See Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1347-49. Medtronic made four arguments in support of its
contention that the premarket notification process imposed specific requirements on the
Model 4011 pacemaker lead. See id. at 1348-49. First, Medtronic argued that the FDA's
approval of the pacemaker lead's Premarket Notification Summary constituted a finding
that the device was safe and effective. See id. at 1348. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this
argument, reasoning that the premarket notification process focused on a device's similar-
ity to an existing device not yet proven safe or effective. See id. The court found, there-
fore, that the premarket notification process alone did not impose specific requirements
on the design of the device. See id at 1349. See generally supra notes 23-24 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the premarket notification process).
Second, Medtronic argued that the MDA implicitly recognized pre-MDA devices as
safe and effective. See Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1349. The court rejected this argument because it
found no indication in either the text or legislative history of the MDA that the "grandfa-
thering" of pre-MDA devices constituted a finding of safety or effectiveness. See id. The
court described the MDA as a balancing of two interests: the protection of consumers
from unsafe devices and the fostering of the development of innovative medical devices
through the assurance of a predictable regulatory and liability climate. See id. (citing S.
REP. No. 94-33, at 10 (1975), H.R. REP. No. 94-853, at 10-11 (1976)). The court believed
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general manufacturing and labeling requirements applicable to the
pacemaker lead did preempt Ms. Lohr's negligent manufacturing and la-
beling claims.
In Medtronic, the Supreme Court decided four issues over which the
lower courts were split.172 First, the plurality held that § 360k did not
preempt all tort claims by an injured plaintiff against a medical device
manufacturer. 73 Second, the plurality held that the premarket notifica-
tion process did not impose requirements on the design of medical de-
vices and, consequently, § 360k did not preempt defective design claims
174
against manufacturers of devices marketed through that process.
Third, the plurality held that § 360k did not preempt claims based on al-
leged violations of FDA regulations. 5 Finally, the plurality held that the
Good Manufacturing Practices and labeling and warning requirements
applicable to all medical devices through the MDA did not constitute re-
quirements applicable to a device under § 360k, and, therefore, § 360k
that to grant the same protection to manufacturers of grandfathered devices, which were
not subject to the increased controls of the MDA, would be to give those manufacturers a
regulatory windfall. See id.
Third, Medtronic argued that the FDA's continuing surveillance of the design and la-
beling of the device constituted requirements under the MDA. See id. (citing 21 C.F.R.
§ 807.81(a)(3)(i) (1997) (requiring manufacturers to submit any proposed design changes
to the FDA for approval), and 21 C.F.R. § 895.25 (1997) (empowering the FDA to require
labeling changes)). The court rejected this argument, reasoning that such provisions are
general requirements because the provisions are not restricted to a particular device. See
id.
Fourth, Medtronic argued that the classification procedures created under the MDA
impose specific requirements on devices. See id. (citing 21 U.S.C.A. § 360c (West Supp.
1997) (designating three classes of devices) and 21 C.F.R. § 860.7 (1997) (outlining the
MDA's classification scheme)). The court rejected this argument, reasoning that a re-
quirement is "something called for or demanded" and that classification does not create
demands on Medtronic. Id.
171. See Lohr, 56 F.3d. at 1350. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 801.109 (1997) (requiring all
Class III medical devices to comply with FDA labeling requirements); 21 C.F.R. §§ 820.1-
.198 (listing Good Manufacturing Practices (GMPs) applicable to all Class III devices un-
der the MDA); supra note 167 (discussing the GMPs). With regard to the negligent manu-
facturing claims, the court explained that even though the GMPs were not device-specific
requirements, the GMPs were specific to manufacturing and created standards for the en-
tire manufacturing process. See Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1350. Similarly, the court found the la-
beling regulations to impose specific standards that manufacturers must follow when cre-
ating the labeling for a device, notwithstanding the applicability of the requirements to
other devices. See id.
172. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2253-55, 2358.
173. See id. at 2253 (plurality opinion).
174. See id. at 2254.
175. See id. at 2255.
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did not preempt state law claims based on failure to warn or negligent
manufacturing.
176
A. The Plurality: No Preemption without Device-Specific Regulations
Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice Stevens began by acknowl-
edging that the Court was faced with the task of interpreting the scope of
Congress's intent to preempt state law.'77 Justice Stevens explained that
two presumptions informed the Court's interpretation: first, that federal
regulations do not supersede the police powers of the states unless Con-
gress makes its purpose to supersede "clear and manifest;"" 8 and second,
that Congress's purpose is the "ultimate touchstone" in any preemption
analysis. 79 Based on these two presumptions, the plurality rejected Med-
tronic's argument that § 360k preempted all common law causes of action
against medical device manufacturers.' 80
First, the plurality distinguished § 360k from the preemption clause at
issue in Cipollone.8' Second, the plurality explained that insulating de-
vice manufacturers from tort claims was contrary to the primary purpose
of the MDA, consumer protection.82 Third, Justice Stevens reasoned
that the language of § 360k was not sufficiently unambiguous to over-
come the presumption against preemption of state tort claims.'83 Justice
176. See id. at 2258.
177. See id. at 2250.
178. Id. (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
179. See id. (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)).
180. See id. at 2251 (plurality opinion).
181. See id. at 2251-52; see also Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521-22. Significant to the
Court's holding in Cipollone, the plurality explained, was the narrow focus of the preemp-
tion clause at issue. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2252 (plurality opinion). The plurality
explained that the preemption clause in the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969
"was targeted at a limited set of state requirements-those 'based on smoking and
health'-and then only at a limited subset of the possible applications of those require-
ments-those involving the 'advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of
which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of' the federal statute." Id. The nar-
row focus of the Act enabled Cipollone to maintain some common law claims. See id.
The plurality explained that to accept Medtronic's broad reading of the preemptive
scope of the MDA would require the Court to intrude impermissibly into state sovereignty
and also preclude Lohr from obtaining any remedy for her injuries. See id. Due to the
combination of the ambiguity of § 360k and the potentially broad preemptive effect of the
statute, the plurality determined that Congress had not indicated a clear intent to preempt
all state tort claims. See id.
182. See id.; see also Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat.
539 (1976) (stating in the preamble that the purpose of the Act is "to provide for the safety
and effectiveness of medical devices intended for human use").
183. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2251 (plurality opinion). Justice Stevens acknowl-
edged that the Court, in an opinion authored by him in Cipollone, had held that a statute
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Stevens explained that if Congress had intended to prohibit state law
causes of action, it should have prohibited "remedies" under state law,
rather than "requirements. "' Finally, the plurality examined the legisla-
tive history of § 360k and found no indication that the provision was in-
tended to preempt all state tort claims.'85 The plurality found that Con-
gress enacted § 360k to alleviate its concerns regarding the risk of
additional or inconsistent federal or state regulation rather than in an ef-
fort to eliminate preexisting common law duties. 186
The plurality next considered whether the Eleventh Circuit correctly
preserved Ms. Lohr's claims based on negligent design.'87 The viability of
Ms. Lohr's design claim depended on whether the premarket notification
process imposed federal safety requirements on the device's design.'8
The plurality held that § 360k did not preempt the negligent design
claim, reasoning that the premarket notification process did not concern
the safety of the pacemaker lead and had no impact on the design of thed • 189
device. The premarket notification process, the plurality found, merely
compared the 4011 lead with a pre-1976 lead that the FDA had not
tested for safety.'9°
The plurality next addressed Ms. Lohr's argument that, even if FDA
requirements regarding the manufacturing and labeling of the 4011 lead
did exist, as the Eleventh Circuit held, § 360k should not preempt the
claims based on alleged violations of those requirements.'9 ' The plurality
which precluded requirements under state law also preempted state tort claims. See id.
(citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521-22 (1992)). Justice Stevens rec-
onciled the two opinions, explaining that reading the term "requirement" broadly in
Cipollone did not result in a complete denial of judicial remedies for plaintiffs, as such a
reading would require in Medtronic. See id. at 2251-52.
184. See id. at 2251.
185. See id. at 2253.
186. See id.; see also 122 CONG. REc. 5850, 5855 (Mar. 9, 1976) (statement of Rep.
Collins) ("opposing further 'redundant and burdensome Federal requirements"' while
"discussing efforts taken in the MDA to protect small businesses from the additional re-
quirements of the Act"). The plurality found no reference to concerns that tort actions
would impede the development of medical devices in the legislative history of the Act. See
Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2253 (plurality opinion). Rather, the plurality explained, "[t]o the
extent that Congress was concerned about protecting the [medical device] industry, that
intent was manifested primarily through fewer substantive requirements under the Act,
not the pre-emption provision ...." Id.
187. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2254.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See id.; see also Adler, supra note 17, at 516 (noting that if the pre-1976 device
"poses a severe risk or is ineffective," then the substantially equivalent device may also be
"risky or ineffective").
191. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2255. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that Lohr's
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agreed, finding that a damages remedy does not impose additional re-
quirements on a device but, rather, provides an incentive for manufac-
turers to comply with existing requirements. The plurality determined
that § 360k did not prohibit state damages remedies for breach of com-
mon law duties that parallel federal requirements, and that common law
claims based on violations of federal requirements were parallel to the
federal requirements.193
The plurality's final consideration focused on whether § 360k pre-
empted Ms. Lohr's manufacturing or labeling claims.194 The plurality
analyzed the language of § 360k'9' and the FDA regulations interpreting
196that section, finding that both a state and federal requirement must be
specifically applicable to the device in question before § 360k triggers
preemption.'97 The plurality held that § 360k did not preempt Ms. Lohr's
manufacturing and labeling claims because the relevant MDA provisions
applied to all medical devices and, therefore, were not the product of the
federal government having balanced the competing interests relevant to
the requirement.! The plurality also noted that, because Florida did not
claims were preempted on the basis of the pleadings so it did not determine whether the
claims, in fact, included alleged violations of FDA regulations. See id. at 2255-56.
192. See id. at 2255. The plurality then addressed the FDA's interpretation of the
scope of § 360k and found that the Agency's interpretation supported the conclusion that
the section did not preempt claims based on violations of existing requirements. See id. at
2255-56; see also 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(2) (1997) (providing that "[federal law] does not
preempt State or local requirements that are equal to, or substantially identical to, re-
quirements imposed by or under the act").
193. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2255. The plurality acknowledged that a state law
cause of action alleging violations of duties created by federal law may include additional
elements, such as proof that the violations were the result of negligent conduct or that the
violations created an unreasonable danger for recipients of the device. See id. The Court
found, however, that the additional elements would make the state requirements narrower
than the federal requirements. See id. Despite its finding that the narrower state re-
quirements differed from the federal requirements in a literal sense, the plurality found
that the difference did not provide sufficient reason to warrant preemption. See id. See
generally 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1) (1994) (prohibiting state requirements that are different
from existing federal regulations).
194. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2256.
195. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1) (prohibiting state requirements "with respect to a device..
different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this [Act] to the de-
vice" (emphasis added)).
196. See 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1997).
197. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2257-58.
198. See id. at 2258. This line of reasoning, in which courts focus on the impact of state
law on federal regulatory schemes is known as the "delicate balance" theory of preemp-
tion. See Corboy & Smith, supra note 7, at 461. Commentators Philip Corboy and Todd
Smith suggest that courts adopting the delicate balance theory of preemption may find
preemption even when congressional intent to preempt state law is absent or ambiguous,
thereby departing from the principle that congressional intent is the "ultimate touchstone"
[Vol. 47:721
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr
specifically develop the general common law requirements underlying
Ms. Lohr's claims for medical devices, such requirements were too gen-
eral to fall within the preemptive scope of § 360k as envisioned by both
Congress and the FDA.'99
Significantly, the plurality declined to rule on whether common law
duties never constitute requirements under § 360k.2'0 The plurality did
take notice of 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b), an FDA regulation providing that §S •• 201
360k preempts state law established by court decision, which some
courts had used as a basis for preemption.202 The plurality determined,
however, that in 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b), the FDA referred to court deci-
sions construing positive enactments of law.
in preemption cases. See id. But cf. Mary Ann K. Bosack, Cigarette Act Preemption-Re-
fining the Analysis, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 756, 798 (1991) (arguing in favor of the "delicate
balance" theory of preemption).
199. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2258. However, the plurality already had conceded
that state requirements of general applicability are subject to preemption if they effec-
tively establish a "substantive requirement for a specific device." Id. at 2257.
200. See id. at 2258-59 (plurality opinion). The plurality declined to rule on whether
common law duties never constitute requirements under § 360k for two reasons. See id. at
2259. First, because the MDA did not preempt any of Ms. Lohr's claims, the plurality did
not find it necessary to resolve hypothetical cases. See id. Second, because of the substan-
tial importance of "device-specificity" in the plurality's construction of § 360k, the plural-
ity concluded that future instances where the MDA would preempt common law claims
would be very rare. See id. at 2259. The plurality did note, however, that the Court's
opinion in Cipollone, holding that common law duties impose requirements on manufac-
turers, was not dispositive of the issue because of the significant differences between §
360k and the statute at issue in Cipollone. See id. at 2258 n.19; see also supra note 181
(discussing the Medtronic plurality's comparison of the MDA and the Public Health Ciga-
rette Smoking Act of 1969).
201. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2258 (plurality opinion); 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b) (1997)
(describing § 360k(a) as prohibiting state requirements "having the force and effect of law
(whether established by statute, ordinance, regulation, or court decision)"). In 21 C.F.R.
§ 808.1(d)(1), however, the FDA interprets § 360k(a) as not preempting:
[s]tate or local requirements of general applicability where the purpose of the re-
quirement relates either to other products in addition to devices (e.g., require-
ments such as general electrical codes, and the Uniform Commercial Code (war-
ranty of fitness)), or to unfair trade practices in which the requirements are not
limited to devices.
Id. As some commentators note, if § 360k(a) "does not preempt general bodies of law
such as the UCC... [then], a fortiori, it would not preempt broader, more established
bodies of general law such as common law torts." Adler & Mann, supra note 14, at 940.
202. See King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130,1134, 1137 (1st Cir. 1993); Bravman v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 842 F. Supp. 747, 755, 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Lamontagne v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 834 F. Supp. 576, 582-86 (D. Conn. 1993), affd, 41 F.3d 846
(2d Cir. 1994); Cameron v. Howmedica, Div. of Pfizer Hosp. Prods. Group, Inc., 820 F.
Supp. 317, 319, 231 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
203. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2258 (plurality opinion) (citing 42 Fed. Reg. 30,383,
30,385 (1977)). But see Herrmann & Ritts, supra note 18, at 17 (arguing that state com-
mon law principles such as "implied warranty law ... [would remain] enforceable until it
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Justice Breyer authored a concurring opinion to emphasize that the
MDA may preempt state law tort actions in certain crcumstances.0
Citing Cipollone, Justice Breyer argued that the legal duties arising out
of tort actions do constitute state-imposed requirements within the
meaning of "requirement" under § 360k. 25 Accordingly, he deemed the
MDA's prohibition on any additional or different state requirements to
preempt state tort actions alleging that federally mandated conduct is
206
negligent.
B. The Dissent: The MDA Expressly Preempt Common Law Claims
Justice O'Connor, in dissent, argued that the Court should not look
beyond the language of § 360k to determine the preemptive scope of the
MDA.2 °7 First, relying on Cipollone, the dissent determined that all
common law claims constitute requirements because the imposition of an
obligation to pay damages is an effective means of controlling conduct .2
Relying on the plain language of § 360k, the dissent argued that any
common law claim that resulted in a requirement different from or in
required a medical device manufacturer to redesign its product," at which point the state
law would be displaced).
204. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2259 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
205. See id.
206. See id. Justice Breyer argued that excluding requirements arising out of state tort
actions from § 360k's prohibition on additional or different state requirements would have
the effect of granting a single state jury more power to regulate medical devices than state
legislators and administrators. See id. Justice Breyer specifically disagreed with the plu-
rality's conclusion that future incidents of preemption under the MDA would be rare. See
id. at 2262. Justice Breyer also found the portion of the plurality opinion that differenti-
ated between § 360k and the preemption statute at issue in Cipollone to be irrelevant. See
id. at 2261-62.
Having concluded that the plain language of § 360k preempted some state tort actions,
Justice Breyer then considered whether the MDA preempted Lohr's claims. See id. at
2260. Justice Breyer found the language of § 360k to be ambiguous regarding when fed-
eral requirements preempt state requirements. See id. ("The words 'any [state] require-
ment' and 'any [federal] requirement,' for example, do not tell us which requirements are
at issue, for every state requirement that is not identical to even one federal requirement is
'different from, or in addition to' that single federal requirement..."). Like the plurality,
Justice Breyer looked to the FDA for guidance on the preemptive scope of § 360k. See id.
Justice Breyer reasoned that, in addition to the statute's inherent ambiguity, deference to
the FDA was particularly warranted because the FDA is fully responsible for administer-
ing the MDA and, therefore, has a "special understanding" of the effect of state regula-
tions on federal objectives. See id.
207. See id. at 2262 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined Justice O'Connor in her opinion.
See id.
208. See id. (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247
(1959)).
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addition to a federal requirement was subject to preemption.2°9 The dis-
sent criticized the plurality's deference to the FDA regulation requiring
device-specific state and federal requirements to trigger preemption.21
The dissent then determined which of Ms. Lohr's claims were pre-
empted by the MDA, without regard to device specificity."' Justice
O'Connor argued that § 360k preempted only Ms. Lohr's negligent
212
manufacturing and failure to warn claims. The dissent reasoned that a
resolution of such claims against the defendant "would compel Med-
tronic to comply with requirements different from or in addition to those
required by the FDA."2"3
IV. MED TRONIC, INC. V. LOHR: PRESERVING THE PREEMPTION
DEFENSE FOR MANY FEDERALLY REGULATED INDUSTRIES
214In Medtronic v. Lohr, the Supreme Court resolved the conflict
among the federal circuit courts over the MDA's preemptive effect on
state tort claims.25 The plurality concluded that the MDA did not pre-
empt state tort claims against the manufacturer of a device unless there
was a federal requirement specifically applicable to that device under the
216MDA. The plurality also held that the MDA did not preempt state tort
claims alleging that a manufacturer violated federal regulations. 217 This
decision will have considerable impact on the lower courts' preemption
analyses in future medical device cases.
209. See id. at 2263.
210. See id.; see also 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(1) (1997); supra note 201 (providing the rele-
vant text of the regulation).
211. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2263-64 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
212. See id. at 2264. The dissent agreed with the plurality's findings regarding Lohr's
claims based on both defective design and alleged violations of federal regulations. See id.
at 2263-64. The dissent explained that § 360k did not preempt Lohr's defective design
claims because the premarket notification process did not impose requirements on the de-
sign of the device. See id. at 2264. The dissent reasoned that § 360k did not preempt
Lohr's claims based on alleged violations of federal regulations because such claims would
not impose requirements on Medtronic different from or in addition to federal require-
ments. See id. Additionally, the dissent noted that § 360k did not prohibit "different or
additional remedies" imposed under state law. See id.
213. Id. at 2264.
214. 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996).
215. See supra Part II (discussing the preemptive effect given to the MDA by some
federal circuit courts).
216. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2257.
217. See id. at 2255-56. The dissent agreed with the plurality's holding that § 360k did
not preempt Lohr's claims alleging that Medtronic violated federal requirements. See id.
at 2264 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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The three opinions of the Court also indicate how the Supreme Court
likely will rule on the preemptive effect of other federal statutes on state
tort claims.218 Four Justices properly sought to return to the Silkwood
line of reasoning, which treated tort law as an insufficiently direct form of
state regulation to warrant preemption. 2' 9 These four Justices properly
found the language of the MDA's preemption clause to be too ambigu-
ous to overcome a presumption against preemption. 220 A majority of the
Court, however, continues to subscribe to the Court's treatment of tort
claims in Cipollone.1
21
A. Impact on Future Medical Device Cases
1. Substantially Equivalent Devices
The Court's holding in Medtronic eliminates a preemption defense for
manufacturers of medical devices that have bypassed the premarket ap-
proval process and have come to the market as substantially equivalent
devices.222 The plurality's finding that the premarket notification process
does not impose requirements on the design of medical devices 23 will
218. See, e.g., Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of 1968 (RCHSA), Pub. L.
No. 90-602, 82 Stat. 273 (1968) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360kk(a)(1) (1994))
(cellular phones); National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-
563, 80 Stat. 718 (1966) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1988)); Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), Pub. L. No. 125-104, 61 Stat. 163
(1947) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994)). The RCHSA authorizes the
FDA to "prescribe performance standards ... to control the emission of electronic prod-
uct radiation from such products if it determines that such standards are necessary for the
protection of the public health and safety." 21 U.S.C. § 360kk(a)(1). Additionally, when
the FDA has promulgated a standard under the RCHSA, the Act prohibits states from
imposing standards that conflict with the federal standard. See 21 U.S.C. § 360ss.
The preemptive scope of the RCHSA may have significant consequences because scien-
tists have not yet determined whether the increasingly popular phones are safe. See Mike
Mills, Still Waiting for the Call. Do Cellular Phones Cause Brain Tumors? Researchers' In-
ability to Provide an Answer So Far is Only Raising More Questions, WASH. POST, Apr. 6,
1997, at HI. Cellular telephones emit radiation that allegedly causes brain tumors. See id.
The number of Americans who use cellular phones has increased from roughly fifteen
million in 1993 to roughly 45 million in 1997, the majority of whom opt for hand-held
models that place the radiation emitting antennas next to the brain. See id. See generally
Verb v. Motorola, Inc., 672 N.E.2d 1287 (I11. App. Ct. 1996) (involving an action against a
telephone manufacturer alleging that cellular phones should be accompanied by safety
warnings).
219. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2251 (plurality opinion); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
220. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2251 (plurality opinion).
221. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 523 (1992).
222. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2254; id. at 2264 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
223. See id. at 2254; id. at 2264 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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preserve future negligent design claims brought against manufacturers of
non-approved devices.2  The Court's conclusion that the requirements
applicable to all non-approved medical devices through the MDA are
too general to warrant preemption2 2 1 likewise will preserve manufactur-
ing and labeling claims against manufacturers of non-approved devices.
2. Future Unclear for Investigational and FDA-Approved Devices
A preemption defense clearly will remain available for manufacturers
• 221
of medical devices that are subject to specific federal requirements.
The Medtronic decision, however, leaves undecided the question of
whether the premarket approval or investigational device exemption
processes impose device specific requirements. The decision will likely
have the effect of preserving a preemption defense for manufacturers of
medical devices obtaining premarket approval in at least some jurisdic-
tions, notwithstanding the Medtronic plurality's conclusion that Congress
did not intend for the MDA to preempt most common law claims. 7 An
224. For example, in Reeves v. AcroMed Corp., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
found that the MDA did not preempt an "unreasonably dangerous per se claim" against
the manufacturer of a bone implant that arrived on the market through the premarket no-
tification process. See 103 F.3d 442, 447 (5th Cir. 1997). Unreasonably dangerous per se
claims are essentially similar to defective design claims. See id.
225. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2258; id. at 2261 (Breyer, J., concurring).
226. See Papike v. Tambrands Inc., 107 F.3d 737, 740-42 (9th Cir.) (finding that FDA
regulation mandating that tampon labels contain specific substantive information pre-
empts tort claims based on failure to warn), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 166 (1997).
227. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2252 (plurality opinion); see also King v. Collagen
Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1135-36 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding that the premarket approval process
imposes requirements on a device). The plurality's conclusion that Congress did not in-
tend the MDA to preempt most state law tort claims probably will not prevent courts from
finding preemption in future medical device cases because the precedential authority of a
case is limited to its ratio decidendi. See Mark Alan Thurmon, Note, When the Court Di-
vides: Reconsidering the Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42
DUKE L.J. 419, 423 (1992). The ratio decidendi of a case is comprised of only the "conclu-
sions necessary to reach the result in that case." Id. In order to determine whether a con-
clusion is part of the ratio decidendi of a case, an effective test is to reverse the meaning of
the conclusion and then see whether the result of the case would remain the same. See id.
at 423-24. If the result of the case does not change when the meaning of a conclusion is
reversed, then the conclusion is not part of the ratio decidendi of the case and is merely
dicta. See id. at 424. The Wambaugh test for finding the ratio decidendi of a case was re-
fined by Professor A.L. Goodhart, who emphasized the significance of determining what
facts a judge believed to be material to the outcome of a case. See id. (citing Arthur L.
Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161 (1930)). The pre-
vailing approach for determining the ratio decidendi of a case is that "[t]he ratio decidendi
of a case is any rule of law expressly or impliedly treated by the judge as a necessary step
in reaching his conclusion, having regard to the line of reasoning adopted by him." Id. at
426 (quoting RUPERT CROSS & J.W. HARRIS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 72 (4th ed.
1991)).
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examination of the plurality opinion in Medtronic shows that significant
parts were mere dicta.28 In Part IV of the opinion, a part in which Jus-
tice Breyer did not join, the plurality concluded that § 360k was not in-
tended to preempt most common law duties enforced by state damages
actions.29 The plurality arrived at this conclusion after finding that the
Court's reasoning in Cippolone was not dispositive of the preemptive
scope of the MDA because of differences in the statutes at issue. 30 The
plurality also based this conclusion on its finding that the legislative his-
tory of the MDA offered no indication that Congress intended the MDA
to preempt most state tort claims.23' Additionally, in Part VI of its opin-
ion, the plurality concluded that future instances of preemption under
the MDA would be few because it would be rare for a substantive re-
232quirement for a specific device to result from a common law claim. All
of the above conclusions, however, were unnecessary for the Court to
hold that the MDA did not preempt Ms. Lohr's claims because the plu-
rality had determined that no federal requirements were applicable to
Medtronic's pacemaker lead that would have preempted Ms. Lohr's
claims anyway.33
A comparison of the plurality and concurring opinions of Medtronic
exposes two areas of agreement on matters leading to the outcome of the
case.2 Both the plurality and concurring opinions agree that the MDA
do not preempt common law claims unless there is a federal regulation
specifically applicable to the device,235 and that the premarket notifica-
tion process does not impose device specific regulations.2 36 Both opinions
228. See supra note 227 (discussing the limited precedential authority of Supreme
Court plurality decisions).
229. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2253 (plurality opinion).
230. See id. at 2252; see also supra note 181 (discussing the plurality's differentiation
between the narrow scope of preemption clause in the Public Health Cigarette Smoking
Act of 1969 at issue in Cipollone and the broad scope of § 360k at issue in Medtronic).
231. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2252-53 (plurality opinion).
232. See id. at 2259.
233. See id. at 2257. It is clear that these conclusions are not part of the plurality's ra-
tio decidendi because, Justice Breyer, while rejecting these conclusions in his concurring
opinion, nonetheless arrived at the same outcome. See id. at 2261-62 (Breyer, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment).
234. These areas of agreement are critical to determining the ratio decidendi, and
hence, the precedential authority of the opinion. Determining the ratio decidendi of a plu-
rality decision is a two-step process. See Thurmon, supra note 227, at 426. First, the ratio
decidendi for the main opinion and each concurring opinion must be determined. See id.
Second, the rationes decidendi of all the opinions must be compared to determine the ex-
tent of agreement among them. See id.
235. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2256-57, 2260-61.
236. See id. at 2258; id. at 2261 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
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also agree that common law claims alleging violations of FDA require-
ments do not impose additional or different requirements on a device.237
Accordingly, the precedential value of Medtronic is limited to these ar-
238
eas.
Five Justices239 agreed that state tort actions impose requirements, just
like positive enactments of state law, and are subject to preemption by
240the MDA in some instances. Unlike the premarket notification proc-
ess, which imposes no requirements on the design of a device and only
general requirements on the manufacturing and labeling of a device,
some courts have found that the premarket approval process imposes
many specific requirements on the design, labeling, and manufacture of a
device.14' The premarket approval process requires applicants to submit
242design plans, proposed labeling content,2 3 and manufacturing meth-
judgment).
237. See id. at 2255 (plurality opinion); id. at 2259 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
238. See supra note 227 (discussing the precedential authority of a decision); supra
note 234 (discussing the methodology for determining the ratio decidendi of plurality
opinions).
239. The five Justices were Breyer, Thomas, Scalia, O'Connor, and Chief Justice
Rehnquist. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2259 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment); id. at 2262 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
240. See id. at 2259 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id.
at 2262 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
241. See King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1135-36 (1st Cir. 1993). But see Ken-
nedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1459 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2579
(1996) (stating that "[t]he fact that the premarket approval process involves specific re-
quirements must not be confused with the premarket approval requirement itself acting as
a specific requirement" (internal citation omitted)). In one post-Medtronic case, the New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division considered how the United States Supreme
Court's reasoning in Medtronic extends to cases involving extended wear contact lenses
that had undergone premarket approval review. See Sowell v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 656
N.Y.S.2d 16, 19-20 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). The court conceded that the premarket ap-
proval review process was much more rigorous than the premarket notification process,
but found that it did not impose specific requirements on the device at issue. See id. at 20.
The court reasoned that the premarket approval process was applicable to all medical de-
vices subject to the process, with no requirements being specifically applicable to contact
lenses. See id. Additionally, the court noted that the Supreme Court granted certiorari,
vacated the judgment, and remanded for consideration in light of Medtronic, a Seventh
Circuit decision finding that § 360k preempted a plaintiffs tort claims because the device
in question had undergone premarket review. See id. at 21 (citing Mitchell v. Collagen
Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2576 (1996)).
242. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(B) (1994) (requiring applicants for premarket ap-
proval to submit "a full statement of the components, ingredients, and properties and of
the principle or principles of operation, of such device").
243. See id. § 360e(c)(1)(F) (requiring the applicant to submit a sample of the pro-
posed labeling of the device).
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ods24 for the device to the FDA for approval. Courts that deem the
premarket approval process imposes requirements on a device, due to
the comprehensiveness and specificity of the process, will find preemp-
tion of tort claims against medical device manufacturers. 25
B. A Preemption Defense Will Likely Remain Available for
Manufacturers of Other Federally Regulated Products
The Supreme Court's decision in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr 2 6 is of little
precedential value outside the medical device field.247 A majority of the
Court did not subscribe to the plurality's reasoning to the extent that the
plurality sought to limit the impact of Cipollone and return to the virtu-
ally conclusive presumption against preemption of state tort claims evi-
dent in Silkwood. The Court's decision in Medtronic, however, does
provide an indication of how the Justices are likely to divide when the
Court hears future cases involving preemption of tort claims. Two fed-
eral statutes that include preemption clauses similar to that of the
MDA 248 are the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966
(NTMVSA) 249 and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA).250
The NTMVSA prohibits states from imposing motor vehicle safety
standards that differ from the federal standards promulgated under the
244. See id. § 360e(c)(1)(C) (requiring applicants to submit "a full description of the
methods used in, and the facilities and controls used for, the manufacture, processing, and,
when relevant, packing and installation of, [the] device").
245. Similarly, courts that deem the Investigational Device Exemption application ap-
proval process to impose specific requirements on devices will continue to find preemption
of tort claims. See generally supra note 20 (discussing the IDE). For example, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals, after Medtronic, found that § 360k preempted all of the plain-
tiff's tort claims against the manufacturer of a device that had come to the market through
an IDE. See Martin v. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 105 F.3d 1090, 1098-1101 (6th Cir.
1997), cert. denied,118 S. Ct. 850 (1998).
246. 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996).
247. See supra note 227 and accompanying text (discussing the precedential authority
of the Medtronic plurality opinion); see also Verb v. Motorola, Inc., 672 N.E.2d 1287 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1996). In Verb, the Appellate Court of Illinois rejected plaintiffs' argument that
Medtronic required a finding that the Electronic Product Radiation Control Act did not
preempt tort claims based on misrepresentation and breach of warranty. See id. at 1293.
The court reasoned, in part, that Medtronic was inapplicable because the Medtronic Court
was interpreting a different statute. See id. at 1294.
248. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (1994).
249. Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (1966). In 1994, Congress enacted a revised traf-
fic safety statute that made no substantive changes to the NTMVSA. See Pub. L. No. 103-
272, 108 Stat. 745 (1994) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30169 (1994)).
250. Pub. L. No. 125-104, 61 Stat. 163 (1947) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-
136y (1994)).
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Act." '  Automobile manufacturers have successfully argued that the
NTMVSA preempts common law claims alleging that a vehicle is defec-
tively designed because it does not have an airbag.z2 Essential to the
success of the manufacturers' preemption defense was the courts' treat-
ment of the duties arising out of common law claims as state-imposed
standards.53 After Medtronic, 24 where five Justices agreed that common
251. See 42 U.S.C. § 30103(b) (1994). The NTMVSA also included a savings clause
that provides that compliance with federal standards issued under the Act does not ex-
empt a party from any common law liability. See 42 U.S.C. § 30103(e). Courts, however,
often find preemption of design defect and negligent design claims against automobile
manufacturers using an implied conflict preemption analysis. See, e.g., Montag v. Honda
Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414, 1417 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 61 (1996); Pokorny v.
Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116, 1122-23 (3rd Cir. 1990); Wood v. General Motors Corp.,
865 F.2d 395, 402 (1st Cir. 1988).
252. See supra note 251 (listing cases finding preemption of claims against automobile
manufacturers). Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208 requires automobile
manufacturers to either install airbags, shoulder-and-lap belts, or another passive protec-
tion systems. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1996). Automobile manufacturers have raised
three different arguments in support of preemption of tort claims alleging that cars manu-
factured without airbags were negligently or defectively designed. See Ralph Nader & Jo-
seph A. Page, Automobile-Design Liability and Compliance with Federal Standards, 64
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 415, 436 (1996). First, automobile manufacturers have argued that
the Traffic Safety Act, on its face, precludes plaintiffs from "claiming that any aspect of a
vehicle's design was defective" when the design complies with regulations promulgated by
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) under the Act. See id.; see
also Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116, 1118-19 (3d Cir. 1990); Taylor v. General
Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 823 (11th Cir. 1989). Second, manufacturers have argued that
the Traffic Safety Act impliedly preempts such claims when a manufacturer can demon-
strate compliance with federal regulations. See Nader & Page, supra, at 436; see also
Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1118-19. Third, manufacturers have argued that the Act impliedly
preempts such claims because Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208 provides
automobile manufacturers with the option of installing passive protection systems other
than airbags and that allowing tort damage awards for failing to opt for airbags would frus-
trate congressional intent. See Nader & Page, supra, at 436; see also Pokorny, 902 F.2d at
1119; Taylor, 875 F.2d at 827.
Due to the uncertainty over the preemptive effect of the NTMVSA, some courts have
reached a decision on the merits as to whether an automobile that is not equipped with an
airbag is defectively designed. See Peter L. Kahn, Regulation and Simple Arithmetic:
Shifting the Perspective on Tort Reform, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1129, 1142 n.49 (1994). Compare
Taylor, 875 F.2d at 821 (holding that a claim based on an automobile manufacturer's fail-
ure to equip an automobile with an airbag is viable under Florida law) and Staggs v.
Chrysler Corp., 678 F. Supp. 270, 273 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (holding same under Georgia law),
with Wilson v. Ford Motor Co., 656 F.2d 960, 960 (4th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (finding an
automobile manufacturer not liable for design attributes that aggravated, rather than
caused an injury).
253. See Wood, 865 F.2d at 402. Courts finding both implied and express preemption
under the NTMVSA have shared this understanding of the common law duties arising
from tort claims. See Staggs, 678 F. Supp. at 272-73 (implied preemption); Vanover v.
Ford Motor Co., 632 F. Supp. 1095, 1096-97 (E.D. Mo. 1986) (express preemption).
254. 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996).
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law damage awards are state-imposed requirements, the courts will
probably continue to find preemption of tort claims under the
NTMVSA.255
Similarly, FIFRA, which requires an EPA-approved label on chemicals
regulated by the Act, contains a clause prohibiting state labeling re-
quirements different from or in addition to the approved label."' Fol-
lowing the Supreme Court's Cipollone25 7 decision, courts concluded that
FIFRA preempts improper labeling claims against manufacturers who
have complied with EPA regulations."" Again, essential to the success of
chemical manufacturers' preemption defense was the treatment of com-mon aw laim asstat-imosed " .259
mon law claims as state-imposed requirements. Because a majority of
255. For example, in Harris v. Ford Motor Co., the Ninth Circuit found that the
NTMVSA preempted a state-law tort claim alleging that an automobile was designed
defectively because it did not have an airbag. See 110 F.3d 1410, 1414 (9th Cir. 1997). The
court found that Standard 208 was precisely the type of specific requirement that would
preempt a common law claim under Medtronic. See id. at 1414 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2258 (1996).
256. See 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1994) (providing that a "[s]tate shall not impose or con-
tinue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from
those required under this subchapter").
257. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
258. See Welchert v. American Cyanamid, Inc., 59 F.3d 69 (8th Cir. 1995) (breach of
express warranty claim); Taylor AG Ind. v. Pure-Gro, 54 F.3d 555 (9th Cir. 1995) (inade-
quate warning claim). FIFRA provides that before a pesticide may be registered with the
EPA, the labeling must comply with FIFRA requirements. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(B)
(1994).
259. See Welchert, 59 F.3d at 73. In Welchert, for example, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that state court consideration of an EPA approved label would constitute
an additional requirement and that FIFRA, therefore, preempted the plaintiff's claims.
See id. In Welchert, the plaintiffs, the Welchert family, were commercial farmers. See id.
at 70. In May 1989, property leased by the Welcherts was treated with a herbicide manu-
factured by defendant, American Cyanamid. See id. According to the herbicide's label,
vegetables could be planted safely on herbicide treated land within 18 months after an ap-
plication of the chemical. See id. See generally 7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (1994) (defining pesti-
cides under FIFRA to include herbicides). Relying on the information stated on the her-
bicide's label, the Welcherts planted crops on the land in 1991. See Welchert, 59 F.3d at 70.
When the crops failed to grow, the Welcherts filed suit against Cyanamid seeking to re-
cover for the damage to their crops allegedly caused by the herbicide. See id. The com-
plaint included claims of breach of express and implied warranties. See id. The district
court held that FIFRA preempted the implied warranty claims but did not preempt the
express warranty claims. See id.
The issue on appeal was whether FIFRA preempted the Welcherts' express warranty
claim. See id. at 72. Relying on Cipollone, the Eighth Circuit understood common law
claims to constitute state-imposed requirements. See id. at 71, 73. In Cipollone, the Su-
preme Court held that the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, which contained
preemption language similar to that in FIFRA, did not preempt breach of express war-
ranty claims because an express warranty represents a requirement voluntarily undertaken
by the warrantor, rather than one imposed by state law. See 505 U.S. at 525 (plurality
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the Court in Medtronic 26 agreed that common law damage awards consti-
tute state-imposed requirements, courts will continue to find preemption
under FIFRA.261
C. A Majority of the Supreme Court Ignored Congressional Intent and
the Historical Presumption Against Preemption of State Tort Claims
With its decision in Medtronic, the Supreme Court correctly preserved
Ms. Lohr's common law claims.262 The reasoning adopted by a majority
of the Court, however, failed to apply the fundamental principles of pre-
emption analysis: that the touchstone of any preemption analysis is the
intent of Congress,263 and that the intent of Congress to supersede the
264historic police powers of the states must be clear and manifest. The
Court should have based its decision on the reasoning of Silkwood that:
(1) the presumption against preemption in areas traditionally subject to
the police powers of the state forces the conclusion that a statute does
not preempt state common law claims without any mention of such
claims and without the creation of an alternative remedy; and (2) com-
mon law damages are an insufficiently direct form of regulation to trigger
conflict preemption.
Congress undoubtedly was aware of the significance of tort law to both
manufacturers and consumers when it enacted the MDA, as evidenced
by House reports discussing the extensive litigation surrounding deaths
and injuries allegedly caused by defective medical devices.266  Justice
Breyer and the dissenting Justices therefore unreasonably concluded that
Congress's clear and manifest intent was to grant the medical device in-
dustry immunity from tort claims when the MDA did not address such
opinion). The Eighth Circuit distinguished the express warranty claims arising from EPA
required labels from the claims in Cipollone, explaining that the voluntary nature of ex-
press warranties is missing when the EPA dictates their content. See Welchert, 59 F.3d at
72 (citing Lowe v. Sporicidin Int'l, 47 F.3d 124, 129 (4th Cir. 1995)). Accordingly, the
court found that FIFRA preempted the Welcherts' express warranty claims because the
claims were based solely on EPA-mandated labeling. See id. at 73.
260. 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996).
261. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2259 (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); id. at 2262 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
262. See id. at 2259 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
263. See id. at 2250.
264. See id. (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
265. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984); see also supra Part L.A
(discussing Silkwood).
266. See H.R. REP. No. 94-853, at 8 (1976). At the time Congress considered the
Medical Device Amendments, "the [Dalkon] Shield had been linked to sixteen deaths and
twenty-five miscarriages," resulting in more than 500 lawsuits seeking aggregate punitive
and compensatory damages of more than $400 million. Id.
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claims and did not create an alternative remedy for injured plaintiffs.267
In Medtronic, Justice O'Connor, in support of her conclusion that com-
mon law damage awards are a form of direct state regulation, cited the
Supreme Court's decision in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Gar-268
mon. The Garmon decision, however, involved a situation in which
Congress determined that the National Labor Relations Board should beS269
the plaintiff's exclusive source of remedy, unlike the MDA where Con-
gress did not provide plaintiffs with any federal remedy. 270 Additionally,
the Medtronic Court ignored the fact that damages awards do not have
the same direct regulatory effect on a manufacturer as do administrative
and legislative regulations, and, therefore, should not be considered
state-imposed requirements.27' Faced with an administrative or legisla-
tive regulation, a manufacturer has no choice but to comply with the
267. Justice Breyer's and the dissenting justices' conclusion is particularly unreason-
able where Congress is enacting legislation intended to protect the public from unsafe or
ineffective medical devices. At the time Congress passed the MDA, most courts viewed a
manufacturer's compliance with federal safety standards as merely constituting "some evi-
dence of due care," rather than being dispositive of the issue, or preemptive. See Adler &
Mann, supra note 14, at 940 n.184; see also Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d
1025, 1027-28 (1st Cir. 1973); LaGorga v. Kroger Co., 275 F. Supp. 373, 378 (W.D. Pa.
1967); Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 661 (Cal. 1973); Burch v. Amsterdam
Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1085-86 (D.C. Ct. App. 1976); Jonescue v. Jewel Home Shopping
Serv., 306 N.E. 2d 312, 316 (IlI. App. Ct. 1973); Rumsey v. Freeway Manor Minimax, 423
S.W.2d 387,394 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
268. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2262 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959), for the proposition that
"[state] regulation can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through
some form of preventive relief").
269. See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 247; see also Barbara L. Atwell, Products Liability and
Preemption. A Judicial Framework, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 181, 189-90 (1991) (noting that the
Court's decision in Garmon "does not necessarily affect other cases where the normal pre-
sumption against preemption applies").
270. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2251 (plurality opinion). In Part IV of the plurality
opinion of Medtronic, which only four Justices joined, Justice Stevens noted that the MDA
did not create any rights of action for injured consumers. See id. Addressing Medtronic's
argument that the MDA preempted any common law claims against a manufacturer of
medical devices brought by injured consumers, Justice Stevens found the lack of any fed-
eral cause of action to be evidence to the contrary. See id.
271. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 536-37 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) ("The level
of choice that a defendant retains in shaping its own behavior distinguishes the indirect
regulatory effect of the common law from positive enactments [of law]."). See generally
Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of Products Liability,
60 Mo. L. REV. 1, 69-70 (1995). Bogus notes that a manufacturer is free to continue sell-
ing his product after a finding of liability, and that while the manufacturer may be forced
to raise the price of that product to cover the costs of the liability, it is simply a result of
market forces if the manufacturer is thereby driven from the market. See id. at 69.
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regulation or cease doing business.272 Faced with a damages award, a
manufacturer may choose to pay the award, consider the award a cost of
doing business, and take its chances with another jury in the future.7 3
Additionally, the Court failed to consider that the underlying goal of tort
awards, particularly those involving compensatory damages, is to com-
pensate victims, not to regulate conduct. As a result of the Supreme
Court's flawed reasoning in Medtronic, courts will continue to find pre-
emption of state tort claims contrary to congressional intent.
V. CONCLUSION
Medtronic v. Lohr indicates that a majority of the Supreme Court does
not adhere to the historical presumption against preemption of state tort
claims. Only four Justices sought to return to the pre-Cipollone era,
where federal statutes enacted to protect health and safety did not fore-
stall injured plaintiffs' tort claims against regulated defendants. By fo-
cusing on the FDA's interpretation of the MDA's preemptive scope and
the issue of device specificity, instead of focusing on the purpose of the
statute and the nature of common law damages, the Court ensured that
plaintiffs injured by premarket approval-exempt devices may seek com-
272. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 536-37 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in
the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
273. See id. at 536.
274. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 263-64 (1984) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting in part).
275. For example, Congress did not intend FIFRA's prohibition on additional or dif-
ferent state requirements relating to the labeling of chemicals to include common law du-
ties arising out of state tort claims. Shortly after the Supreme Court decided Silkwood, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Ferebee v. Chevron
Chemical Co., held that FIFRA did not preempt a failure to warn claim against the manu-
facturer of a FIFRA regulated chemical manufacturer. See 736 F.2d 1529, 1543 (D.C. Cir.
1984); see also Corboy & Smith, supra note 7, at 470 (asserting that Congress's lack of re-
sponse to Ferebee was evidence of a lack of intent that FIFRA preempt tort claims). The
complaint in Ferebee alleged that a chemical manufacturer's EPA-approved label failed to
warn of the dangers of prolonged contact with the skin. See 736 F.2d at 1531-32. The
court reasoned that the damages award did not require Chevron to change its label or stop
selling the chemical in Maryland; rather, the award served to warn Chevron that it may
have to compensate victims if it continued to sell the chemical in that state. See id. at 1541.
Additionally, the court noted that common law claims against FIFRA-regulated manufac-
turers may serve to further the goals of FIFRA because such claims provide an additional
incentive for manufacturers to improve their labeling. See id. at 1541-42.
In 1988, Congress extensively revised FIFRA. See H.R. REP. No. 100-939 (1988). At
that time, Ferebee was the only federal appellate opinion analyzing the preemption of tort
claims by FIFRA. See Corboy & Smith, supra note 7, at 470-71 (asserting that Congress's
lack of response to Ferebee indicated that Congress did not intend FIFRA to preempt
state tort claims). Congress, however, made no substantive changes to the preemption
clause in FIFRA and did not indicate any disagreement with Ferebee. See id.
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pensation. The Court also fostered the possibility that people injured by
federally regulated actors will find their claims preempted by statutes en-
acted to promote safety.
